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Chapter 1
Introduction
Entrepreneurial activity is volatile in many economies, changing rapidly from
euphoria to deep depression. Such fluctuations have become especially evident for
many developing countries that fell into financial stress after the Asian crisis of the
late 1990s, where economic activity has been stymied at low levels and unemploy-
ment has remained high for prolonged periods of time.
Figure 1.1: GDP Growth Gap 1995-1999: Emerging Markets and Developed Coun-
tries
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Figure 1.1 shows the gap between GDP growth in each year and its average for
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the last 25 years for both major developed countries and emerging markets.1 One
can observe that both groups of countries were growing above their long-run poten-
tial in 1995-1996, and that deviation from long-run averages was much higher for
emerging economies than for developed countries. When the crisis hit, the output
growth of developing countries fell well below average in 1997 and 1998. Meanwhile,
developed economies experienced just a mild slow down in 1997. By 1999, emerging
markets had recovered and were again growing above their average, again at a higher
deviation from long-run average than that of the major advanced countries. This
figure presents evidence of the more volatile output response experienced by emerg-
ing markets to the unfavorable shocks arising from the Asian crisis, as compared to
the evolution of this index for major advanced countries.
One of the objectives of this dissertation is to provide an alternative expla-
nation for the stylized fact described above by further exploring the role of the
entrepreneurial sector in creating frictions in the real economy. There are numerous
models explaining business cycle fluctuations as a result of financial imperfections.
However, there are fewer models that describe the behavior of the entrepreneurial
sector as an additional mechanism of amplification and propagation of shocks. I will
focus my attention on entrepreneurs as producers of the capital necessary for the
production of final goods. As we will see, imperfections affecting entrepreneurial
activity will impact the GDP of an economy by directly impacting the economy’s
1Major advanced economies include only the G7 countries. As defined by the IMF, developing
economies are all countries excluding the Euro area, the G7 economies and the newly industrialized
Asian economies (Hong Kong, Singapore, Korea and Taiwan Province of China.)
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supply of capital goods. In particular, in order to finance their capital purchases,
entrepreneurs enter in a contractual relationship with lenders, and that relationship
is subject to frictions. One of these imperfections is that there is private information,
an assumption that is standard in the financial friction literature.2
The second problem has been much less explored in the literature and arises
from entrepreneurial risk aversion. Before analyzing the impact and relevance of
this assumption, one may wonder how realistic this assumption may be, as it is
commonly believed that entrepreneurs are risk neutral, or even risk lovers. In fact,
most existing models of financial markets and investment decisions with financial
frictions assume risk-neutrality for simplicity. However, as Gale and Hellwig (1985)
point out, “risk-neutrality is not an unreasonable assumption to make in the case of
investors since it can be justified as a consequence of risk-pooling. It makes less sense
in the case of entrepreneurs and indeed is merely a ‘simplifying’ assumption which
should be relaxed if possible.” What Gale and Hellwig imply, and what I would
point out, is that there is a distinction between being risk neutral and limiting risk
through diversification. Lenders, even though they are risk averse, because they
are able to hold diversified portfolios and can easily pool their risk, they manage to
considerably reduce risk. Therefore, assuming risk neutrality for lenders is generally
deemed plausible.
Although simplifying assumptions are necessary in order to develop an eco-
nomic model with predictive power, the relaxation of these assumptions often pro-
vides enlightening information about economic behavior. In fact, risk aversion ap-
2See Bernanke and Gertler (1989).
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pears to be particularly relevant for private entrepreneurs, or those entrepreneurs
that invest in privately-owned companies. These companies are typically small and
owned by few or even a single entrepreneur. As Moskowitz and Vissing-Jørgensen
(2002) show, private entrepreneurs usually invest an important percentage of their
wealth in private companies, often comprising at least 50 percent of their assets.
Further, the vast majority of entrepreneurs invest in a single company, and are thus
highly vulnerable to project-specific uninsurable fluctuations. As a consequence,
private entrepreneurs are not likely to have access to complete insurance markets
for their idiosyncratic risks,3 so that complete risk-pooling is not always a viable
option.
In light of these observations, risk aversion is arguably a more realistic as-
sumption in modeling the investment decisions of private entrepreneurs. In this dis-
sertation, I study the role that imperfect information together with entrepreneurial
risk aversion play in affecting the equilibrium and dynamics of a general equilibrium
macro model. I analyze the effects of these frictions both at the micro level, in terms
of the optimal contract between lenders and borrowers, and at the aggregate level
within the context of a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model.
This analysis follows a set-up similar to Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999),
where there are information asymmetries between lenders and borrowers. The bor-
rower, or entrepreneur, invests in a project using both his own net worth and bor-
rowed funds. The entrepreneur has private information on the true ex-post profitabil-
ity of the project. Agency problems arise from the fact that there is a positive prob-
3See Angeletos and Calvet (2003) and Meh and Quadrini (2004).
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ability that the project will fail, in which case the lender will not be able to recover
the whole amount of the remaining revenues after default due to some bankruptcy
costs. As a result, lenders optimally charge the entrepreneur an external finance
premium in addition to the lender’s opportunity cost of funds. As in Bernanke and
Gertler (1999), this endogenously determined external finance premium (the “finan-
cial accelerator”) is decreasing in the level of net worth of entrepreneurs, as investing
a greater proportion of borrowed funds increases the agency costs internalized by
the lender. This external finance premium becomes a mechanism that magnifies and
propagates real shocks over the business cycle (see Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist,
1999).
Introducing risk aversion among entrepreneurs modifies the optimal contract
in two ways. First, risk-averse entrepreneurs demand insurance in order to ensure
a positive minimum consumption. Therefore, the external finance premium will re-
flect not only the lender’s opportunity costs and bankruptcy costs described above,
but also the cost of providing this insurance. Second, the overall risk premium, or
the total rental cost of capital beyond the opportunity cost of funds, will consist of
both the external finance premium and a positive risk premium that risk-averse en-
trepreneurs demand due to the stochastic nature of their private investment returns.
This risk premium is referred to in this dissertation as the private equity premium,
and implies that entrepreneurs are willing to supply less capital to final goods firms
for a given rental rate of capital. The equilibrium price paid by final goods firms
to rent capital from entrepreneurs will depend on the interaction between these two
premia.
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When the private equity premium exists, in general equilibrium it becomes a
mechanism that magnifies and propagates the aggregate effects of real shocks over
time. Specifically, any real shock that reduces (increases) entrepreneurial profits and
wealth increases (reduces) the entrepreneur’s effective risk aversion and the private
equity premium in the opposite direction. In response, entrepreneurs adjust their
supply of capital to final goods firms, producing a magnified impact on output, con-
sumption and both entrepreneurial profits and net worth in subsequent periods. As
a consequence, the model predicts that economies with a relatively larger privately-
held private sector, all else equal, should be more volatile than economies with a
relatively more important publicly-traded corporate sector.
The combined effect of entrepreneurial risk aversion and private information
is studied in two alternative scenarios. I first examine a general closed-economy
framework, which isolates the role of the private equity premium as an additional
mechanism of amplification of shocks in a large economy framework, such as the
United States or Europe. This work complements Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist
(1999) by incorporating risk aversion and hence the private equity premium into the
analysis, and differs from other recent works that deal with risk aversion and market
imperfections. For instance, Angeletos and Calvet (2003) examine the implications
of the risk premium on private equity, but in their work the degree of market incom-
pleteness is exogenous, while in this model entrepreneurs endogenously determine
the amount of self-insurance. As it turns out, this insurance is incomplete for in-
centive reasons that become apparent in section 2.1.2. This paper is also similar
to Rampini (2004), in that entrepreneurs cannot fully diversify their idiosyncratic
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risk, as they must bear some risk due to financial incentives. However, Rampini
focuses on how investment risk affects entrepreneurial activity, disregarding the role
of financial imperfections, such as constraints on external funding and the risk of
default, which play a crucial role in my model.
This dissertation is also related to Meh and Quadrini (2004), as they also
explicitly model investment risk that results in optimal contracts that cannot provide
full insurance due to the presence of agency costs. However, they model agency
problems from the exogenous probability of diversion of retained capital for private
benefits, while in this paper agency costs result from asymmetries in information on
the stochastic variable. Their paper also differs in how the overall risk premium and
the extent of insurance are determined in the model. In Meh et al., entrepreneurs
self-insure through contingent instruments, while in this paper, the risk premium
and insurance arise from the interaction between risk-aversion frictions and their
impact on the lender-borrower relationship. This difference is particularly relevant
as the evolution of insurance will be the dynamic driving force behind the private
equity premium. Finally, these authors study capital accumulation, while I analyze
the response of shocks in terms of amplification and propagation.
Related empirical evidence shows that the private equity premium (or the
premium on equity of privately held traded firms) is similar in many ways to the
public equity premium (the premium on equity of publicly traded firms) commonly
described in the literature. Moskowitz and Vissing-Jørgensen (2002), for instance,
document that, on average, the market return to private equity is surprisingly no
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higher than the public equity return.4 This result is puzzling considering that pri-
vate equity is dramatically concentrated, both in terms of its importance for total
entrepreneurial net worth and in terms of diversification. Additionally, they find
that public and private equity returns are highly correlated5 and that indexes of re-
turns are equally volatile. Nonetheless, the objective of this paper is not to explain
this puzzle, but rather to explore the implications of the private equity premium in
the context of a general equilibrium model.
The next chapter studies the role of domestic private entrepreneurs in the
context of a small open economy. The purpose of this section if two-fold. First,
I examine the role of exchange rates in affecting the private equity premium and
the model’s equilibrium and dynamics. In particular, changes in the real exchange
rate affect not only the economy’s international trade, but also capital flows. For
instance, a real depreciation of the local currency benefits the economy by increasing
the cost of exports. On the other hand, it raises the cost of producing capital by
increasing both the value of imports (assuming that capital is partially produced
using imported goods), and the value of debt repayment (assuming that part of
this small economy’s source of funds is foreign denominated debt). The fact that an
4They estimate the average return on private equity to be 12.3 percent in the period 1990-92,
17.0 percent in 1993-95, and 22.2 percent in 1996-98. Meanwhile, considering a weighted index of
NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ for firms of equivalent size, they find that over the same periods,
the average returns to public equity were 11.0 percent, 14.6 percent and 24.7 percent, respectively.
See also Gottschalg, Phalippou and Zollo (2004) for further evidence.
5Many authors find that the public equity return is countercyclical. See Mehra and Prescott
(2003) for discussion and recent evidence.
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economy borrows mainly in foreign currency is commonly referred to in the literature
as liability dollarization.6 I find here that the exchange rate helps alleviate the
propagating feature of the private equity premium. In particular, the exchange rate
overshoots in anticipation of the amplified response of entrepreneurs due to changes
in wealth and the private equity premium, and it quickly re-adjusts back when the
entrepreneur’s response actually takes place. This faster adjustment of the exchange
rate after this overshooting implies opposite effects on entrepreneurial wealth and,
therefore, quicker recovery of the private equity premium and investment to their
steady state values.
Second, in this section I also execute an exchange rate regime comparison when
this modified setup of risk averse entrepreneurs is considered. I study whether the
existence of the private equity premium may challenge the conclusion from previous
research that the expansionary effect of a nominal devaluation more than offsets
its contractionary impact, even taking into account the adverse effect implied by
the financial accelerator, implying that flexible exchange rate regimes are preferable
to fixed regimes in terms of absorbing the effects of real shocks.7 I show that the
greater volatility associated with flexible exchange rate regimes increases the private
equity premium and, thus, the supply of capital, amplifying the output response
to shocks. I find that fixed exchange rate regimes could be preferable under less
restrictive conditions than, for instance, the “unrealistic” set of parameters found
6See Calvo and Reinhart (1999) and Chang and Velasco (2000).
7For analysis along these lines, see Ce´spedes, Chang and Velasco (2000) and Bernanke, Gertler
and Natalucci (2001).
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by Ce´spedes, Chang and Velasco (2000).
The outline of this thesis is as follows. Following this introductory chap-
ter, Chapter 2 presents, solves and discusses the closed economy framework. The
first section of this chapter examines the partial equilibrium interaction between a
risk-averse entrepreneur and a risk neutral lender. I analyze the structure of this
augmented risk premium, compare it with the benchmark case where all agents are
risk neutral, and analyze how this risk premium is affected by different levels of net
worth, the bankruptcy cost factor, risk aversion and the volatility of stochastic re-
turns. Section 2.2 embeds these partial equilibrium results into a stochastic dynamic
general equilibrium model. Following Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Carlstrom and
Fuerst (1996) and Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999), the point of departure for
this analysis is a real business cycle model, where the basic financial friction involved
is the external finance premium determined endogenously by the level of involve-
ment of entrepreneurs. I depart from these papers by allowing entrepreneurs to be
risk averse. Parametrization of the model and simulation exercises are presented in
section 2.3.
Chapter 3 analyzes the open-economy specification of the model, following a
structure similar to Chapter 2. In section 3.2, I review the optimal contract between
the domestic risk averse entrepreneur and the international lender. In analyzing the
equilibrium features of the model, I consider the impact of a depreciation of the local
currency on the generated supply of capital, in addition to the impact of changes in
other parameters, such as risk risk aversion, default costs, net worth and volatility.
Section 3.3 analyzes the aggregate effects of the risk premium implied by the optimal
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contract, first under flexible prices (Section 3.4) and then when there are nominal
rigidities, so that monetary policy imposes real effects on the economy (Section 3.5).
In the latter section, I briefly examine the effect of the private equity premium under
both flexible and fixed exchange rate regimes, followed by an exchange rate regime
comparison analysis, where I contrast the response to shocks under both regimes.
Chapter 4 provides some concluding remarks.
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Chapter 2
The Closed Economy Framework
2.1 The Partial Equilibrium Model: The Optimal Contract
This section analyzes the implications of the optimal contract between a lender
and a borrower in partial equilibrium in order to examine the risk premium that
arises from bankruptcy costs and entrepreneurial risk aversion.
There are two groups of participants in this model. Risk averse entrepreneurs
finance their purchase of capital using both their internal net worth as well as
external, borrowed financing. Entrepreneurs then rent this capital to final goods
firms. Meanwhile, risk-neutral lenders provide financing to entrepreneurs and receive
a financial return for this service.
The contract between borrowers and lenders is subject to informational fric-
tions. More specifically, the actual level of capital available for production following
investment is private information and is idiosyncratic to each entrepreneur, though
its distribution is common knowledge. The entrepreneur decides on the level of in-
vestment (and therefore, borrowing) prior to the realization of the stochastic return
to investment. The realization is then revealed to the the entrepreneur as private
information. Assuming costly state verification (Townsend, 1979), lenders can ob-
serve the return to investment only if they pay an auditing cost. Since it would only
be optimal for the lender to accept this cost if the entrepreneur were not fulfilling
12
his contractual repayment, the auditing cost can also be interpreted as a bankruptcy
cost: a default allows lenders to observe the entrepreneur’s private information, but
they cannot recover all the remaining revenues if the entrepreneur goes bankrupt.
This can be further interpreted as the cost that lenders face due to the fact that
they are not familiarized with the business of the entrepreneur, and for simplicity
the cost is assumed to be a constant fraction of remaining revenues. Notice that the
only source of uncertainty is the idiosyncratic realization of effective capital, and
thus there is no aggregate uncertainty. Therefore, throughout this dissertation the
existence of an optimal contract is conditional to this assumption.
Standard literature on the lender-borrower relationship suggests that under
the circumstances described above, lower involvement of the entrepreneur in the
project raises the implicit agency problem due to the conflict of interest involved.
In equilibrium, lenders require compensation above and beyond the opportunity cost
of their funds, or an external finance premium. When entrepreneurs are risk-averse,
they will also require a premium due to the stochastic nature of the return on their
investments, henceforth referred to as the private equity premium. As will become
evident in section 2.1.2, risk aversion also imposes an extra cost on lenders, as they
must provide insurance to the entrepreneur. These costs will also be incorporated
into the external finance premium.
To provide a benchmark case, and for presentational purposes, section 2.1.1
briefly analyzes the optimal contract when all agents are risk-neutral. As in previous
literature, I find that informational frictions lead to a negative relationship between
optimal entrepreneurial involvement and the external finance premium. This section
13
serves as the point of departure for section 2.1.2, which deals with the case where
entrepreneurs are risk-averse.
To motivate imperfect information, let us assume that the effective units of
capital available for production after entrepreneur j’s purchase of Kjt+1 units of raw
capital is uncertain and depends on the realization of a random variable ωj, namely
ωjKjt+1
with a known distribution function H(ω) with strictly positive support, in which
Et(ω) = 1.
Every period, the entrepreneur makes ωjKjt+1 units of capital available to
final good firms for production, charging a real rental rate of Rt+1, which, in this
section, is assumed to be constant and known beforehand (Rt+1 will be endogenized
in section 2.2). Thus, the entrepreneur faces the equivalent of a linear production
function, where the return to capital is given by
Rt+1ω
jKjt+1
I assume complete depreciation of capital after one period.
Additionally, suppose that entrepreneur j’s net worth may not be enough to
cover all of his investment. Then, the level of borrowing (Bjt+1) is the portion of
total investment not covered by the entrepreneur’s internal net worth (N jt ):
Bjt+1 = K
j
t+1 − λjtN jt (2.1)
where λt is the proportion of net worth that the entrepreneur chooses to use in
14
the risky investment, considering that the entrepreneur can also invest in risk-free
assets.
Borrowing is provided by competitive risk neutral lenders that charge a con-
tractual nominal gross interest rate Zjt+1. Therefore, the nominal repayment for an
entrepreneur j in engaging in a contract for Bjt+1 units of debt is given by
Zjt+1B
j
t+1
The optimal contract minimizes the agency problem, considering that the
entrepreneur will choose the ex-ante optimal level of investment, taking as given
for now variables that are known as of period t, such as prices, entrepreneurial net
worth, and the aggregate return to capital for period t + 1 (Rt+1). These variables
will be endogenized in the general equilibrium model in section 2.2. The realization
of ωj does not affect the decision of how much to invest, though it will influence the
entrepreneur’s repayment decisions. As in Carlstrom and Fuerst (1996), I assume
that entrepreneurs can maintain enough anonymity that it is possible for them to
engage in one-period contracts with lenders, regardless of their repayment history.
2.1.1 Model with Risk-Neutral Entrepreneurs: The Benchmark Case
This section looks at the structure of debt repayment when all actors are
risk-neutral and there are informational frictions resulting from agency problems.
This section is used as a benchmark for the case where the entrepreneur is risk-
averse. Since a risk-neutral entrepreneur cares only about the mean return to his
investment, he is willing to bear all of the risk. Hence, in non-bankruptcy states,
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the entrepreneur is able to guarantee the lender (who does not freely observe the
state of nature) a constant repayment per unit of debt, safe from all idiosyncratic
risk, such that the lender is willing to participate in this contract.
Let ω¯j define the realization of ωj such that the entrepreneur breaks even.
Therefore, ω¯j solves:
ω¯jRt+1K
j
t+1 = Z
j
t+1B
j
t+1 (2.2)
If ωj ≥ ω¯j, the project succeeds, and due to costly state verification, the
lender optimally charges a fixed repayment per unit of capital, independent of the
realization of ωj (the true realization of ω remains private information). On the other
hand, if the realization of ωj is lower than ω¯j, then the entrepreneur defaults on his
contracted debt. In such a case, the lender learns the true value of ωj and takes
possession of fraction 1−µ of the remaining revenues, with µ being the bankruptcy
cost rate.
Under this set-up, the resulting lender participation constraint is that the
expected return from lending to entrepreneur j must not be lower than the lender’s
opportunity cost:
[1−H(ω¯j)] ω¯jRt+1Kjt+1 + (1− µ)
∫ ω¯j
0
ωRt+1K
j
t+1 dH(ω) ≥ (1 + ρt+1)Bjt+1 (2.3)
Following this scheme, entrepreneur j’s expected profits can be represented by
(1 + ρt+1)(1− λjt)Nt +
∫ ∞
ω¯j
ωRt+1K
j
t+1 dH(ω)− [1−H(ω¯j)] ω¯jRt+1Kjt+1 (2.4)
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where the first term is the return from investing in the risk-free asset, and second
and third term represent the risky investment’s expected revenues and expected
repayment, respectively. Equations (2.3) and (2.4) describe what is called a standard
debt contract, which under this setup is an optimal contract (Gale and Hellwig,
1983).
Proposition A standard debt contract with maximum equity participation
weakly dominates any other optimal contract.
Proof Consider for now that in case of bankruptcy, risk-free assets are pro-
tected from confiscation by limited liability. The optimization problem would then
solve:
max
{λjt ,ω¯,Kjt+1}
(1 + ρt+1)(1− λjt)Nt +
∫ ∞
ω¯
(ω − ω¯)Rt+1Kjt+1 dH(ω)
subject to lender participation constraint
∫ ∞
ω¯
ω¯Rt+1K
j
t+1 dH(ω) + (1− µ)
∫ ω¯
0
ωRt+1K
j
t+1 dH(ω) = (1 + ρt+1)[K
j
t+1 − λjtN jt ]
Since E(ω) =
∫∞
0 ω dH(ω) =
∫ ω¯
0 ω dH(ω) +
∫∞
ω¯ ω dH(ω) = 1, then
∫ ω¯
0
ωRt+1K
j
t+1 dH(ω) = Rt+1K
j
t+1 −
∫ ∞
ω¯
ωRt+1K
j
t+1 dH(ω)
Then the lender participation constraint can be re-expressed as
∫ ∞
ω¯
ω¯Rt+1K
j
t+1dH(ω)+Rt+1K
j
t+1−
∫ ∞
ω¯
ωRt+1K
j
t+1dH(ω)−µ
∫ ω¯
0
ωRt+1K
j
t+1dH(ω) =
(1 + ρt+1)[K
j
t+1 − λjtN jt ]
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The lender participation constraint can be re-expressed as
∫ ∞
ω¯
(ω − ω¯)Rt+1Kjt+1 dH(ω) =
= Rt+1K
j
t+1 − µ
∫ ω¯
0
ωRt+1K
j
t+1 dH(ω)− (1 + ρt+1)[Kjt+1 − λjtN jt ] (2.5)
Therefore, the objective function can be re-written as
(1+ ρt+1)(1−λjt)Nt+Rt+1Kjt+1−µ
∫ ω¯
0
ωRt+1K
j
t+1 dH(ω)− (1+ ρt+1)[Kjt+1−λjtN jt ]
or equivalently,
Rt+1K
j
t+1 − µ
∫ ω¯
0
ωRt+1K
j
t+1 dH(ω)− (1 + ρt+1)[Kjt+1 −N jt ] (2.6)
which is independent of λjt .
Therefore, under limited liability, the entrepreneur is indifferent to how much
of his wealth is kept in safe assets. Intuitively, any increase in expected utility
coming from having more assets free from seizure are completely compensated by the
increase in the contractual interest rate (Zjt+1) that entrepreneurs face. The latter
comes from the fact that lower entrepreneurial upfront contribution to the project
(λjtN
j
t ) are translated into higher lender opportunity cost and agency costs. If there
was not limited liability, then risk-free assets would be confiscated in defaulting
states, the first term of entrepreneurs objective function would drop out and λjt
would be strictly equal to one, as that would minimize agency costs. Therefore,
for simplicity I will assume for the rest of this section that the entrepreneur invests
all his net worth in the project (i.e., λjt = 1), and holds no risk-free assets, so that
equation (2.1) is re-expressed as:
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Bjt+1 = K
j
t+1 −N jt (2.7)
Thus, the optimal contract determines the value of capital (Kjt+1) and the re-
payment per unit of capital (ω¯j) that maximizes the entrepreneur’s objective func-
tion (2.4), subject to the lender’s participation constraint (2.3). The optimality
conditions from this maximization problem provide the contract’s optimal level of
capital, given the distribution of ω, and the value of the variables Rt+1, N
j
t (taken
as given in this section) and parameters µ and ρt+1. Specifically, the optimality
conditions imply the following relationship:
[1−H(ω¯)]
∫ ∞
ω¯
ωRt+1 dH(ω) = [1−H(ω¯)]
∫ ∞
ω¯
ω¯Rt+1 dH(ω)+
[1−H(ω¯)](1 + ρt+1) Nt
Kt+1
+ µω¯h(ω¯)
∫ ∞
ω¯
(ω − ω¯)Rt+1 dH(ω) (2.8)
The left hand side represents the expected returns per unit of capital for the
entrepreneur, which equals the expected realization of the entrepreneur’s investment
in the states of nature for which the entrepreneur does not default (given by the
probability [1−H(ω¯)]). The right hand side of equation displays the cost per unit
of capital for the entrepreneur, which includes the capital repayment rate for the
non-bankruptcy states of nature, and the opportunity cost to the entrepreneur of
investing his net worth. The term µω¯h(ω¯) captures the fact that the bankruptcy
costs change as ω¯ adjusts, since variations in ω¯ change the probability of bankruptcy.
Optimal investment Kjt+1 is an upward sloping function of the exogenous ag-
gregate rental rate of capital, Rt+1. Put differently, final goods firms renting capital
from entrepreneurs face an upward sloping supply curve of capital, in the sense that
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Figure 2.1: Optimal capital stock and net worth.
0 5 10 15 20 25
1
1.01
1.02
1.03
1.04
0 5 10 15 20 25
1
1.01
1.02
1.03
1.04
Firms’ Demand   
    for Capital 
Supply of Capital
      to Firms   
N=2 
N=2.4 
K 
R 
K 
Firms’ Demand   
    for Capital 
mu=0.1 mu=0.05 
mu=0.01 
R Panel (a) Panel (b) 
Supply of Capital
      to Firms   
higher levels of capital are available to them only if the rental rate, Rt+1, is greater.
This relationship between Rt+1 and K
j
t+1 is a manifestation of the entrepreneur’s
cost of funds schedule (as reflected in the contracted gross interest rate, Zjt+1), which
accounts for the lender’s opportunity costs and increasing agency costs associated
with the entrepreneur’s reliance on external financing. Therefore, one would expect
an upward sloping supply of capital for levels of capital above entrepreneurial net
worth (as the level of investor involvement declines, or as leverage rises), and a flat
supply of capital (at the risk-free rate) otherwise. The demand curve for capital
from final goods firms is assumed to be flat at a rental rate Rt+1 for the moment.
This problem can be solved numerically. As a benchmark I assume that the
idiosyncratic variable ω is normally distributed with a mean of 1 and a variance
σ2 = 0.1.1 I set the parameter that represents the costs of bankruptcy (µ) equal to
1The problem can be solved analytically if instead we assume that ω follows a uniform distri-
bution between 0 and 2. In this case the maximization problem may be re-expressed as
max
{Kj
t+1,ω¯
j}
(1− ω¯ + ω¯
2
4
)Rt+1K
j
t+1
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10 percent of revenues. The entrepreneur’s net worth is assumed to be 2, and for
simplicity, the risk-free rate, ρt+1, is set equal to zero. Figure 2.1 plots the optimal
supply of capital, where the dashed line in panel (a) shows the impact of an increase
of 20 percent in net worth. As expected, the supply of capital curve lies above the
risk-free rate when investment exceeds net worth, and is always upward sloping in
Kjt+1. Furthermore, as expected, the lower the bankruptcy cost (µ), the greater the
optimal Kjt+1 for each value of Rt+1, as shown in panel (b). In particular, note that
for µ = 0, the external finance premium would be equal to zero, independent of
the level of entrepreneurial involvement. This result demonstrates how the external
finance premium comes directly from the fact that, due to informational frictions,
the lender cannot completely recover the remaining revenues when the borrower
defaults.
2.1.2 Model with Risk-Averse Entrepreneurs
In this section I assess the impact of assuming that borrowers are risk-averse.
As before, I use a simple one-period maximization problem, maintaining certainty
for the aggregate variables of this model, but allowing for idiosyncratic risk on the
subject to [
ω¯ − ω¯
2
4
(1 + µ)
]
Rt+1K
j
t+1 = (1 + ρt+1) [K
j
t+1 −N jt ]
which yields an equilibrium optimal capital investment scheduled as a function of the rental rate
on capital, risk-free rate and net worth given by
Kjt+1 =
[
Rt+1
1+ρt+1
]
µ2[
Rt+1
1+ρt+1
]
µ2 −
[
Rt+1
1+ρt+1
]2
µ+ µ+ 1 +
[
Rt+1
1+ρt+1
]2
− 2
[
Rt+1
1+ρt+1
] ·N jt
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investment return of individual entrepreneur j.
Analogous to section 2.1.1, entrepreneur j ’s return to capital is determined by
the stochastic realization of ωj, and the optimal contract between the lender and
the entrepreneur again arises from choosing the level of investment that maximizes
the entrepreneur’s expected utility, subject to the lender’s participation constraint.
However, the repayment schedule will not have the same structure as in section
2.1.1, mainly because default risks are not shared by lender and borrower in the
same manner, keeping in mind that lenders are still risk-neutral, but borrowers are
now risk-averse.
For states of nature in which the entrepreneur does not default, the result is
the same as in the standard contract described in section 2.1.1: the entrepreneur
maintains the true realization of ωj as private information. He optimally repays
the lender a fixed amount per unit of debt Zjt+1, and due to costly state verification
the lender does not monitor the true state of nature. In this case, the risk-averse
entrepreneur is willing to assume the risk on the upper part of the distribution of the
return to capital, and the net return to capital is given by ωjRt+1K
j
t+1 − Zjt+1Bjt+1.
On the other hand, for low states of nature, the standard debt contract is no
longer optimal. If we assume that for a risk averse agent the marginal utility of zero
consumption is infinity or very large2, then the optimal contract must ensure the en-
trepreneur positive consumption in any state. One way to accomplish that is for the
entrepreneur to invest in risk-free assets. However, that is not the only possibility.
For default states, which are observable by both parties, the risk-neutral lender can
2See Gale and Hellwig (1985).
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provide a positive return to the risk-averse entrepreneur, equal to Xjt λ
j
tN
j
t ≤ λjtN jt .
That is, the lender can insure a fraction Xjt ≤ 1 of the entrepreneur’s initial contri-
bution to the project.3 Consequently, the entrepreneur can receive insurance directly
from the lender, can invest part of his net worth in risk-free assets, or both.
Proposition With risk-averse entrepreneurs, a debt contract with maximum
equity participation weakly dominates any other optimal contract.
Proof As in the risk-neutral case, let us consider for now that in case of
bankruptcy, risk-free assets are protected from seizure by limited liability. In such a
case, the optimization problem solves:
max
{λjt ,ωˆ,Kjt+1,Xjt }
∫ ωˆj
0
U
{
(1 + ρt+1)(1− λjt)Nt + λjtXjtN jt
}
dH(ω)+
∫ ∞
ωˆj
U{(1 + ρt+1)(1− λjt)Nt + ωjRt+1Kjt+1 − Zjt+1Bjt+1} dH(ω)
subject to lender participation constraint
∫ ∞
ωˆ
ωˆRt+1K
j
t+1 dH(ω) + (1− µ)
∫ ωˆ
0
ωRt+1K
j
t+1 dH(ω)− λjtXjtN jt =
(1 + ρt+1)[K
j
t+1 − λjtN jt ]
that can be re-expressed as
λjtX
j
tN
j
t =
∫ ∞
ωˆ
ωˆRt+1K
j
t+1 dH(ω) + (1− µ)
∫ ωˆ
0
ωRt+1K
j
t+1 dH(ω)
−(1 + ρt+1)[Kjt+1 − λjtN jt ] (2.9)
3If there are no information asymmetries so that states are always observable, the standard
contract theory result calls for a complete insurance from the risk neutral agent to the risk averse
counterpart.
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Additionally, ωˆ solves
λjtX
j
tN
j
t = ωˆ
jRt+1K
j
t+1 − Zjt+1Bjt+1
or
Zjt+1B
j
t+1 = ωˆ
jRt+1K
j
t+1 − λjtXjtN jt (2.10)
Replacing equations (2.9) and (2.10) into the objective function, we get
∫ ωˆj
0
U
{ ∫ ∞
ωˆ
ωˆRt+1K
j
t+1 dH(ω) + (1− µ)
∫ ωˆ
0
ωRt+1K
j
t+1 dH(ω)
−(1 + ρt+1)[Kjt+1 −Nt]
}
dH(ω)
+
∫ ωˆj
0
U
{
(ωj − ωˆj)Rt+1Kjt+1 +
∫ ∞
ωˆ
ωˆRt+1K
j
t+1 dH(ω)+
(1− µ)
∫ ωˆ
0
ωRt+1K
j
t+1 dH(ω)− (1 + ρt+1)[Kjt+1 −Nt]
}
dH(ω)
which is independent of λjt .
Thus, as in the risk neutral case, the entrepreneur invests all his net worth
in the project (i.e., λjt = 1), and retains no part of his wealth in risk-free assets.
Therefore, the entrepreneur maximizes
∫ ωˆj
0
U(XjtN
j
t ) dH(ω) +
∫ ∞
ωˆj
U(ωjRt+1K
j
t+1 − Zjt+1Bjt+1) dH(ω) (2.11)
where ωˆj is the cut-off default/non-default state value.
Entrepreneur j will be indifferent between defaulting or not when the utility of
defaulting equals that of not defaulting. Therefore, the cut-off default/non-default
state value, ωˆj, solves
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XjtN
j
t = ωˆ
jRt+1K
j
t+1 − Zjt+1Bjt+1 (2.12)
or equivalently,
Zjt+1B
j
t+1 = ωˆ
jRt+1K
j
t+1 −XjtN jt (2.13)
Thus, the entrepreneur’s expected utility can be re-expressed as
∫ ωˆj
0
U(XjtN
j
t ) dH(ω) +
∫ ∞
ωˆj
U(XjtN
j
t + (ω
j − ωˆj)Rt+1Kjt+1) dH(ω) (2.14)
where ωˆj also represents the repayment rate per unit of capital in the non-default
states.
The entrepreneur receives XjtN
j
t regardless ω. In addition, if ω
j > ωˆj, the en-
trepreneur gets an extra random return ωjRt+1K
j
t+1 and pays to the lender a fixed
payment ωˆjRt+1K
j
t+1. This insurance can be interpreted as a hedging instrument
available to entrepreneurs, and thus one can think of entrepreneurs as operating
in an environment of incomplete markets, as they do not completely eliminate the
idiosyncratic risk they face. However, one should be cautious with such an inter-
pretation, as the lack complete markets is not exogenously imposed, but rather is a
result of the incentives given to lenders and entrepreneurs. That is, entrepreneurs
are willing to face some uncertainty because it allows them to receive higher returns
by maintaining the realization of ω as private information in good states.
Lenders, for their part, have to pay a positive price to learn the true realization
of ω, and are willing to charge a constant repayment rate to avoid such costs. Hence,
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the lender’s participation constraint is given by
∫ ωˆj
0
[(1−µ)ωRt+1Kjt+1] dH(ω)+
∫ ∞
ωˆj
[ ωˆjRt+1K
j
t+1] dH(ω)−XjtN jt ≥ (1+ ρt+1)Bjt+1
(2.15)
That is, the expected return from lending must be greater than or equal to the
opportunity cost of the lender’s funds.
Therefore, the optimal contract is given by the choice of Kjt+1, ωˆ
j and Xjt
that maximize the entrepreneur’s expected utility (2.14), subject to the lender’s
participation constraint (2.15), taking as given for now N jt , Rt+1, ρt+1, and the
distribution of ω4 The first order conditions with respect to Kt+1 and ωˆ are given
by equations (2.16) and (2.17), respectively.
∫ ∞
ωˆ
(ω − ωˆ) dH(ω)Rt+1 =
[
1 +
E(U ′( )| ω < ωˆ)
E(U ′( )| ω > ωˆ)
]
[
(1 + ρt+1)− (1− µ)
∫ ωˆ
0
ωRt+1 dH(ω) +Rt+1ωˆ[1−H(ωˆ)]
]
− Rt+1
E(U ′( )| ω > ωˆ) Cov{U
′( ), ω} (2.16)
[
1 +
E(U ′( )| ω < ωˆ)
E(U ′( )| ω > ωˆ)
]
=
1
[1−H(ωˆ)]− µωˆh(ωˆ) (2.17)
which after some algebraic manipulation imply the following optimality condition:
4Gale and Hellwig (1985) briefly analyzed an analogous version of this contract and proved that
it is the optimal contract.
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XtNt
Kt+1
+ [1−H(ωˆ)]
∫ ∞
ωˆ
ωRt+1 dH(ω) = [1−H(ωˆ)]
∫ ∞
ωˆ
ωˆRt+1 dH(ω)
+(1 + ρt+1)
Nt
Kt+1
+ µωˆh(ωˆ)
∫ ∞
ωˆ
(ω − ωˆ)Rt+1 dH(ω)
− [1−H(ωˆ)− µωˆh(ωˆ)]
E(U ′( )| ω > ωˆ) · Cov{U
′( ), ωRt+1} (2.18)
Optimal investment decisions in equilibrium equate the entrepreneur’s ex-
pected returns capital to its marginal cost. This condition is captured by the left
and right hand sides of equation (2.18). Specifically, the left hand side is given by
the sum of the insurance that the entrepreneur receives in any state of nature, and
the expected net return to investment in states where the entrepreneur does not
default.
The right hand side of equation (2.18) shows the marginal cost for the en-
trepreneur, which is captured by four components. As in the risk-neutral case, the
first two costs are given by, respectively, the per unit of capital repayment in the
states of nature where the entrepreneur does not default, and the opportunity cost
for the entrepreneur of investing his net worth. The third term, as in the risk-neutral
case, captures the change in expected default costs due to changes in ωˆ. The risk-
averse entrepreneur, however, faces a fourth cost, associated with the risky nature
of his investment’s returns. This last component depends on the covariance between
the return to capital and the entrepreneur’s marginal utility of consumption. Since
the entrepreneur is risk-averse, this covariance is negative. When entrepreneurs are
risk-neutral, the covariance is zero. This additional cost borne by the risk-averse
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entrepreneur due to the cost of facing uncertain returns is what I call the private
equity premium.
The equilibrium rental rate of capital depends first on the external finance
premium, or the component of the pecuniary borrowing cost that corresponds to
the markup over the risk-free interest rate that lenders charge entrepreneurs due to
agency problems and insurance costs. Secondly, the equilibrium rental rate of capital
also depends on the premium required by the entrepreneur due to the stochastic na-
ture of his investments. This second component depends on the covariance between
the entrepreneur’s return and the entrepreneur’s marginal utility of consumption.
As a result, a risk-averse entrepreneur requires a higher expected return on capital
than a risk-neutral entrepreneur in order to invest. In other words, for a given re-
turn to capital, the risk-averse entrepreneur is willing to supply a lower quantity of
capital than the risk-neutral entrepreneur, as uncertainty implies a decrease in his
utility.
Further, this endogenous private equity premium will create an additional
financial friction that causes business cycle fluctuations to become stronger and
sharper and more persistent over time in response to real shocks. This feature
will be analyzed in more detail in the general equilibrium framework in section 2.2.
Before embarking upon that analysis, however, the next section numerically explores
the main attributes of the optimal contract from this section. Specifically, I show
how investment, the insurance rate and the repayment schedule behave in response
to changes in exogenous variables such as the aggregate return to capital (exogenous
at this point, though it will be endogenized in the general equilibrium model), the
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bankruptcy cost parameter, the coefficient of risk aversion and the volatility of the
idiosyncratic return to investment.
Numerical Approach
In order to analyze the main effects of entrepreneurial risk aversion, I select
parameters and solve for the optimal contract numerically.5 As in section 2.1.1, the
goal of this section is to identify the most important features and qualitative results
of the modified financial contract, and to present results on the quantitative impact
of parameter changes.
Figure 2.2 shows the simulated behavior of some variables of interest for dif-
ferent values of the exogenous rental rate on capital. Panel (a) shows the supply
of capital to final goods firms as a function of the exogenous rental rate on cap-
ital. As explained earlier, this upward sloping supply of capital reflects not only
the default cost for the lender, as in section 2.1.1, but also (1) the extra return
that risk-averse entrepreneurs require in order to expose their own net worth by
investing in a risky project, and (2) the cost of insurance that lenders provide to
the risk-averse entrepreneur. In contrast to section 2.1.1, capital will be supplied
only when the rental rate on capital strictly exceeds the opportunity cost of funds.
Risk-averse entrepreneurs demand a real return above the risk-free rate for any pos-
5The benchmark assumptions of section 2.1.1 are repeated with respect to the distribution of
the idiosyncratic variable ω, the cost of bankruptcy (µ), the entrepreneur’s net worth and the
risk-free rate. Additionally, the entrepreneur is assumed to have a CRRA utility function with a
coefficient of relative risk aversion equal to 2.
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Figure 2.2: Real Return on Capital and Optimal Investment
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itive level of investment, even if the investment does not require external financing
(Kjt+1 ≤ N jt+1).
Panels (b) and (c) show how the insurance per unit of net worth (Xjt ) and the
non-default repayment rate per unit of capital (ωˆ) behave as the return to capital
rises. For levels of Rt+1 were borrowing is needed (when K
j
t+1¿N
j
t+1), X
j
t and ωˆ
increase, together with capital, as the return to capital rises. Basically, a rise in
Rt+1 increases the returns from capital investment. The corresponding increase in
Kjt+1 is translated into higher agency costs for the lender that more than offset
the increase in revenues coming from the rise in Rt+1. This can be compensated
through a combination of an increase in debt repayment rate (ωˆ) and the insurance
rate (Xjt ) (the latter due to the increase in defaulting states, that are compensated
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through higher insurance.) For the parameters chosen, the lender is ensured a
minimum consumption as soon as the entrepreneur relies on external financing for
his investment.
For levels of Rt+1 were borrowing is not needed (when K
j
t+1¡N
j
t+1), there is
still risk sharing among lenders and borrowers. Specifically, in those cases the en-
trepreneur lends money to the lender—right hand side of the lender participation
constraint (equation 2.15) becomes negative—and thus, insurance increases and ap-
proaches to 1 (complete insurance). Additionally, as Rt+1 decreases, given that the
lender is effectively borrowing from the entrepreneur, the repayment rate initially
decreases, and then, as the insurance rate increases the repayment rate also needs
to be higher.
The supply curve of capital depends in part on the entrepreneur’s marginal
contractual cost of funds schedule, which is given by Zjt+1 from equation (2.13),
and is shown in panel (d) of Figure 2.2. The entrepreneur’s marginal contractual
cost of funds increases as the return on capital rises, due to increasing opportunity
costs, agency costs and insurance costs associated with levels of investment above
entrepreneurial net worth (recall that Kjt+1 increases when Rt+1 rises). This upsurge
in the marginal cost of funds occurs despite the fact that increases in Rt+1 have a
favorable impact on lender profits.
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Changes in the Default Cost Parameter
Figure 2.3 reproduces Figure 2.2 for different levels of the bankruptcy param-
eter (µ). As shown in panel (a), a lower µ increases the optimal K at each level of
Rt+1. This result can be intuitively explained as follows: a reduction in µ reduces
the cost of bankruptcy, increasing the returns from lending. This change makes
the lender’s participation in the project less costly, where by participation I mean
an increase in ωˆ and a higher provision of insurance Xjt to the entrepreneur. The
lender is therefore willing to bear more risk and allow more default. These effects
can be seen in panels (b) and (c) of Figure 2.3, where for each level of Rt+1, the
optimal ωˆ and Xjt are higher. The lender’s greater involvement, together with the
corresponding increase in the insurance provided, make the marginal contractual
cost of funds increase for each level of Rt+1, as seen in panel (d).
As in the risk-neutral case, in the extreme situation that µ approaches zero, the
optimalK diverges. This means that if this financial friction is “shut-down”, that is,
if the lender can recuperate all revenues in the case of entrepreneurial default, then
the return to capital that borrowers and lenders require in order to carry out the
contract equals the risk-free rate. This is true in spite of the risk-aversion frictions
coming from the borrower. The intuition is straightforward: if there are no costs
of verifying revenue for the lender, risk-neutrality allows the lender to completely
insure the borrower, ensuring him the level of his initial net worth for any state
of nature. In other words, the lender increases his involvement in the project to
the maximum and buys the project from the risk-averse entrepreneur at price N jt ,
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Figure 2.3: Change in µ
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executing the project himself in a frictionless environment.6 This shows that the
existence of private information is crucial for frictions coming from entrepreneurial
risk aversion to have real effects.
In general, however, the lender does not provide full insurance when the cost of
bankruptcy (µ) is positive. Therefore, the risk-averse entrepreneur requires a return
to capital above the risk-free rate, even for levels of investment below his net worth
(that is, when the entrepreneur does not need to rely on external finance).
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Figure 2.4: Change in Internal Net Worth
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Change in Internal Net Worth
Figure 2.4 analyzes the effect of a 20 percent increase in net worth (from 2
to 2.4). From the perspective of entrepreneurs, higher net worth implies higher
guaranteed consumption, which in turn implies a decrease in the private equity
premium. Therefore, the entrepreneur will be willing to invest a greater amount of
capital for each level of Rt+1. This can be seen in panel (a) of Figure 2.4.
The next question is what effect the increase in entrepreneurial net worth has
on the lender. On the one hand, an increase in N jt reduces the lender’s opportunity
cost by (1 + ρt+1)N
j
t (see equation 2.15), as the entrepreneur’s need for external
6This means that Xjt becomes 1 and ωˆ diverges to infinity. These results cannot be seen in the
graphs because there are no equilibria for levels of Rt+1 above the risk-free rate.
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financing decreases. However, higher N jt raises the insurance cost X
j
tN
j
t . The
partial net effect of higher N jt on the lender’s profit is positive, but, as it turns out,
this is completely offset by the increase in the agency cost resulting from the rise
in optimal Kjt+1 at each level of Rt+1. Therefore, neither X
j
t nor ωˆ are affected by
the increase in N jt (panels (b) and (c) of figure 2.4), and thus the marginal cost of
funds remains constant (panel (d) of figure 2.4).
Changes in Risk Aversion
Figure 2.5: Change in Risk Aversion
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Figure 2.5 examines the impact of varying the coefficient of risk-aversion. If
entrepreneurs are more risk-averse, they require a higher return in order to invest in a
risky project. That is, for each level of Rt+1, they invest less capital, as demonstrated
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in panel (a).
Higher risk aversion makes the entrepreneur demand a higher level of insurance
Xjt for each level of Rt+1 (panel (b) of Figure 2.5). This costly insurance negatively
impacts lender profits. However, the decrease in Kjt+1 resulting from a higher level
of risk aversion causes the agency cost to fall, which more than offsets the negative
impact of the increase in Xjt on lender profits. Overall, this allows a small decrease
in ωˆ and, thus, in the marginal cost of funds (panels (c) and (d) of Figure 2.5).
Figure 2.5 also illustrates the impact of risk aversion relative to risk-neutrality.
As expected, risk-neutrality generates impacts similar to lower levels of risk aversion,
although naturally there is no insurance in the case of risk-neutrality.
Figure 2.6: Decomposition of the Risk Premium
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Figure 2.6 shows the decomposition of the overall wedge between the return of
capital and the economy’s risk-free rate (given by the solid line) into components due
to the private equity premium, agency costs and insurance. In particular, the middle
line and the bottom line plot the equilibrium contractual interest rate (Zjt ) and the
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lender cost of providing insurance, for different levels of the equilibrium Kjt+1. The
interpretation is as follows: the gap between the middle line and the bottom line
corresponds to the part of the cost of borrowing that excludes insurance costs, that
is, agency costs. The gap between the solid line and the middle line captures the
return of capital on top of the borrowing costs, which is determined by the private
equity premium.
Changes in the Volatility of Returns
Figure 2.7: Change in Variance
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The effect of an increase in the volatility of returns to capital is qualitatively
similar to that of higher risk aversion. That is, higher variance makes risk-averse
entrepreneurs demand higher returns to capital in order to invest their net worth in
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a uncertain project. That is, as in the case of higher risk aversion, greater volatility
makes the entrepreneur demand a higher level of insurance Xjt and a lower K
j
t+1
for each level of Rt+1. The overall effect on lender profits is positive, allowing the
lender to reduce the non-default repayment schedule ωˆ (and thus, the marginal cost
of funds) for each level of the rental rate on capital, as shown in Figure 2.7.
2.2 The General Equilibrium Model
This section analyzes the dynamics and aggregate effects of the optimal con-
tract by incorporating the modified supply of capital, derived in the previous section,
into a stochastic dynamic general equilibrium model. I consider a closed economy
that produces and consumes one good in an infinite horizon framework. This ag-
gregate good is manufactured with labor (L) supplied by workers, and capital (K)
supplied by entrepreneurs, combined through a standard constant returns to scale
Cobb-Douglas production function
Yt = AtK
α
t L
1−α
t (2.19)
where At is aggregate multifactor productivity.
2.2.1 The Firms
There is a representative firm that maximizes profits by optimally choosing
capital, labor and total output.
Πt = PtYt −RtKt −WtLt
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where Pt is the price of output, Rt is the domestic nominal rental rate on capital
and Wt is the nominal wage paid to the representative worker.
The standard optimality conditions for capital and labor, respectively, from
the firm’s profit maximization are given by:
Rt
Pt
= α
Yt
Kt
(2.20)
Wt
Pt
= (1− α)Yt
Lt
(2.21)
Equation (2.20) represents the aggregate demand for capital. This, together
with the supply of capital coming from the optimal contract, given an aggregate
level of net worth, it will jointly determine the economy’s optimal level of capital
investment (Kt+1) and the rental rate of capital (Rt+1).
The firm’s profits are zero in equilibrium.
2.2.2 Workers
Workers in this model work, consume and save. The representative worker
maximizes his lifetime utility over consumption and leisure,
Et−1
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
logCt − 1
υ
Lυt
]
(2.22)
subject to the budget constraint
PtCt +Dt+1 = WtLt + (1 + ρt)Dt (2.23)
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where υ > 0 is the elasticity of labor supply, Ct is the level of consumption chosen by
the representative worker and Dt+1 stands for deposits (in nominal terms) held at a
financial intermediary earning a risk-free nominal interest rate ρt. Workers’ savings
will finance entrepreneurs’ investments through these financial intermediaries.
The representative worker’s optimality conditions yield the following Euler
equation and labor supply condition:
1
Ct
= β(1 + ρt+1) Et
[ Pt
Pt+1
1
Ct+1
]
(2.24)
Wt
Pt
1
Ct
= Lυ−1t (2.25)
2.2.3 The Entrepreneurs
In contrast to section 2.1, which focused on the entrepreneur as an individual
agent, this section describes the aggregate behavior of the entrepreneurial sector
as a supplier of capital. Entrepreneurs are risk-averse players that supply capital
partly financed by their own net worth (N) and the rest by external borrowing (B).
Therefore, analogous to equation (2.7),
Nt +Bt+1 = Kt+1 (2.26)
The optimal amount of capital supplied to firms is determined by the first order
conditions of the contract (equations 2.16 and 2.17), given the aggregate return
to capital, the amount of net worth they hold in each period, and the value of
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parameters. As seen in section 2.1, these conditions capture both the external
finance premium and the private equity premium that the entrepreneur optimally
requires for engaging his net worth in risky investments.
The condition describing the aggregate equity accrued by the entrepreneurial
sector from renting capital to operating firms is standard, except that the repayment
rate per unit of capital ωˆ also incorporates the cost to the lender of providing
insurance to entrepreneurs (that is, ωˆ is greater than ω¯ from section 2.1.1). From
equation (2.14), the entrepreneurial sector aggregate equity (Vt+1) is given by
Vt+1 = XtNt +
∫ ∞
ωˆ
(ω − ωˆ)Rt+1Kt+1 dH(ω)
which is always positive, though not necessarily greater than the entrepreneur’s
initial net worth. Rearranging terms from the lender’s aggregate participation con-
straint (see equation 2.15), one can show that the entrepreneurial sector aggregate
expected equity (Vt+1) satisfies the following condition:
7
Vt+1 = Rt+1Kt+1 − (1 + ρt+1)Bt+1 − µ
∫ ωˆ
0
ωRt+1Kt+1 dH(ω) (2.27)
which represents the profits from investment, where the second term shows the
opportunity cost and the term µ
∫ ωˆ
0 ωRt+1 dH(ω) captures both the bankruptcy cost
as well as the insurance cost.
7Note that from the lender’s participation constraint, one can use the following expression:
XtNt −
∫ ωˆ
0
ωRt+1Kt+1 dH(ω)−
∫ ∞
ωˆ
ωˆRt+1Kt+1 dH(ω) =
−µ
∫ ωˆ
0
ωRt+1Kt+1 dH(ω)− (1 + ρt+1)(Kt+1 −Nt)
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Evolution of Aggregate Net Worth
In order to simplify the dynamics of aggregate net worth, I assume overlapping
generations of entrepreneurs that live for two periods. As shown in Figure 2.8, an
entrepreneurial generation is born in period t − 1 and receives a bequest N1t−1,
where the subscript denotes the period and the superscript indicates the age of
entrepreneurs. This generation invests its endowment (plus an amount Bt financed
by external borrowing) in a risky project that yields aggregate equity V 2t , as defined
in equation (2.27), in period t.
Figure 2.8: Two-Period Generation of Entrepreneurs
I assume that entrepreneurs, subsequently consume a fraction 1 − δ of their
equity and bequeath the rest to the next generation of entrepreneurs. This new
generation receives this bequest, N1t = δ V
2
t , and carries out risky investment in the
same period. Note that bequests are put into a common pool so that any particular
entrepreneur receives the same bequest as any other entrepreneur from the same
generation. That is, ex-ante, there is homogeneity among entrepreneurs, therefore
all entrepreneurs make the same investment decisions. Heterogeneity emerges from
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the idiosyncratic realization of returns from the production of capital.
This environment allows us to account for the constant creation and destruc-
tion of firms, avoiding the possible scenario that firms accumulate sufficiently high
assets in order to finance their investment without the need to borrow, which would
obviate the purpose of this discussion. It also limits dynamic decision making in the
model to consumers for simplicity.
As a result, the entrepreneurial sector as a whole will bequeath only a fraction
δ of its wealth Vt each period, and will consume the rest (C
E
t ). Therefore, net worth
and consumption of young entrepreneurs at period t can be defined respectively as
Nt = δ
{
(1 + ρt)Nt−1 +
[
Rt − (1 + ρt)− µ
∫ ωˆ
0
ωRt dH(ω)
]
Kt
}
(2.28)
CEt =
1− δ
δ
Nt (2.29)
The impact of shocks on the dynamics of entrepreneurial net worth and its
effects and interaction with the external finance premium and the private equity
premium are schematically summarized in Figure 2.9.8 If there is a shock that
negatively affects entrepreneurs’ profits (Vt), it will reduce the level of net worth
available for the next period, and thus, for subsequent periods. Also, a lower level
of net worth is translated into a lower level of investment for a given Rt+1, since the
agency problems discussed in section 2.1 lead to a higher external finance premium
8Note that this picture does not account for the dynamics of other variables triggered by shocks,
such as the labor market, goods prices, etc.
43
charged by the lender. This reduced level of investment is translated into lower
entrepreneurial profits, further reducing the level of net worth for subsequent peri-
ods. This is the standard “financial accelerator” effect discussed by Bernanke and
Gertler (1999). In addition, the effect of the drop in net worth will also be amplified
due to risk aversion frictions described in section 2.1.2, as lower Nt decreases the
level of insurance XtNt (recall that Xt does not change following changes in Nt.)
A lower level of guaranteed consumption leads entrepreneurs to require a higher
private equity premium for each level of investment. Investment further decreases
for each level of Rt+1, which further reduces future net worth, amplifying the initial
shock over time.
Figure 2.9: External Finance Premium and Private Equity Premium
Propagation of the shock works through lower entrepreneurial profits due to
the decrease in investment. This effect eventually dies out as a depressed supply of
capital increases the rental rate of capital. Note that these model, as other agency
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cost models, is able to generate persistence without having to assume long-lived
capital or persistence in shocks.
2.2.4 Monetary Side, Market Clearing Conditions and the Rational
Expectations Equilibrium
Monetary decisions are not explicitly modeled here and are assumed to be
made by a monetary authority that uses its policy instruments to keep the short-
term interest rate (ρt) fixed, allowing the price level (Pt) to fluctuate.
Market clearing conditions that must be satisfied each period close the model.
For the goods market, production must equal the sum of investment and consump-
tion goods purchased each period:
Yt = Kt+1 + Ct + C
E
t (2.30)
Furthermore, workers’ savings must equal the total debt required by entrepreneurs:
Dt = Bt (2.31)
Therefore, the risk-neutral rational expectations stochastic dynamic general
equilibrium is given by equations (2.3), (2.8), (2.19), (2.20), (2.21), (2.23), (2.25),
(2.26), (2.28), (2.29), (2.30), (2.31) and assumptions on the processes for stochas-
tic variables, that solve for Pt, Yt, Lt, Kt+1, Rt, ω¯t, Wt+1, Nt, Bt+1, Dt+1, Ct, and
CEt . Similarly, the risk-averse rational expectations stochastic dynamic general equi-
librium is defined by equations (2.15), (2.16), (2.17), (2.19), (2.20), (2.21), (2.23),
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(2.25), (2.26), (2.28), (2.29), (2.30), (2.31), along with an assumption on the pro-
cesses for the stochastic variables, solving for Pt, Yt, Lt, Kt+1, Rt, ωˆt, Wt+1, Xt, Nt,
Bt+1, Dt+1, Ct, and C
E
t .
2.2.5 The Log-linearized Model
This section presents the general equilibrium model in terms of variables’ log
deviations from the stochastic steady-state to analyze the local behavior of the model
in response to small shocks.9 The bulk of the derivation is standard.
Aggregate demand
pt + ct +
D
C
dt+1 =
W
C
(wt + lt) + (1 + ρ)
D
C
(dt + ρt) (2.32)
nt
κ
+ (1− 1
κ
)bt+1 = kt+1 (2.33)
ξfocR rt+1 − ξfocω¯ ω¯t + ξfocρ ρt+1 = 0 (2.34)
ξPCR rt+1 + ξ
PC
K kt+1 + ξ
PC
ω¯ ω¯t + ξ
PC
N nt − ξPCρ ρt+1 = 0 (2.35)
εωˆXN(xt + nt) + ε
ωˆ
Rrt+1 + ε
ωˆ
Kkt+1 − εωˆωˆωˆt = 0 (2.36)
εKXN(xt + nt) + ε
K
R rt+1 + ε
K
Kkt+1 − εKωˆ ωˆt + εKρ ρt+1 = 0 (2.37)
9Since I am incorporating the first order conditions and lender participation constraint from
the optimal contract in section 2.1 into the general equilibrium model, a log-linear approximation
is sufficient to capture all second-order effects of risk aversion, in particular the private equity
premium. The log-linear approximation ignores third-order attributes of the entrepreneur utility
function, which are not of central importance in this model. However, higher order approximations
are necessary in case where quantitative welfare analysis is carried out.
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εPCXN(xt + nt) = ε
PC
R rt+1 − εPCK kt+1 + εPCωˆ ωˆt + εPCN nt − εPCρ ρt+1 (2.38)
yt =
K
Y
kt+1 +
C
Y
ct +
CE
Y
cet (2.39)
dt = bt (2.40)
cet = nt (2.41)
Aggregate supply
yt = at + αkt + (1− α)lt (2.42)
rt − pt = yt − kt (2.43)
wt − pt = yt − lt (2.44)
wt − pt − ct = (υ − 1) lt (2.45)
Evolution of State Variables
Nnt = δ
{
[K − µ E(ω|ω < ωˆ)]R rt + [R− µ E(ω|ω < ωˆ)]Kkt (2.46)
+(1 + ρ)B (bt + ρt) + µRωˆ
2h(ωˆ) ωˆt
}
The first block of equations represents aggregate demand. Equation (2.32)
is the log-linearized version of the workers’ aggregate budget constraint (2.23).10
In the steady state, consumption (C) must equal the sum of income from deposits
(ρD) and labor income (W ). Therefore, parameters ρD
C
and W
C
stand for the weights
that explain the change in consumption over time. Equation (2.33) describes the
entrepreneurs’ borrowing needs given investment and available net worth, where the
parameter κ is the steady-state total investment to net worth ratio.
10I normalize the steady state price level to equal 1.
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Equations (2.34) and (2.35) are the log-linearized form of the risk-neutral
contract’s first order condition and the lender participation constraint, respectively.
Similarly, equations (2.36), (2.37) and (2.38) are the log-linearized form of the risk-
averse contract’s first order conditions with respect to ωˆ and Kt+1, and the lender’s
participation constraint, respectively. Given an expectation of a change in Rt+1,
these equations jointly determine the deviation from the steady state of capital
investment and the repayment rate (ωˆ). Parameters ξfoci and ξ
PC
i , ε
ωˆ
i , ε
K
i and ε
PC
i
are constants at the steady state that accompany the endogenous variables. More
details about these constants can be found in appendix 5.2.
Equations (2.39) and (2.40) are the economy-wide resource constraints. Out-
put changes are explained by variation in investment and consumption from workers
and entrepreneurs, weighted by their importance in total output at the steady state
(K
Y
, C
Y
and C
E
Y
, respectively), while debt and deposits are equal every period. Fi-
nally, equation (2.41) shows the evolution of entrepreneurial consumption, which
corresponds to the fraction of profits not saved as net worth, so that both net worth
and ce will vary in the same proportion.
The second block of equations describes the aggregate supply for this econ-
omy. Specifically, equation (2.42) presents the log-linearized version of the produc-
tion function, while equations (2.43) and (2.44) are the first order conditions from
the firm’s profit maximization problem with respect to capital and labor, respec-
tively. Lastly, equation (2.45) is the linearized version of equation (2.25), and shows
workers’ optimal substitution between consumption and work, taking into account
changes in the price level and wages.
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Finally, equation (2.46) introduces the evolution of the model’s state variable,
net worth, as the log-linearized form of equation (2.28).
2.3 Numerical Analysis
This section will explore the effects of small aggregate shocks on some macroe-
conomic variables of interest. Given that only idiosyncratic risk is allowed in this
dissertation, it is only possible to treat one-time shocks to this economy, followed by
perfect foresight dynamics of aggregate variables back to steady state. In particular,
a one-time one percent increase in aggregate multifactor productivity and a one-time
one percent increase in the nominal safe interest rate are separately considered. The
analysis is carried out by examining the impulse response functions that result from
numerically solving the complete system, differentiating between the case where the
effect of risk-aversion is incorporated using an endogenously determined private eq-
uity premium (illustrated in the graphs as a continuous line), and the benchmark
case where entrepreneurs are assumed to be risk-neutral (denoted by a dashed line).
For the benchmark case, equations (2.15), (2.16) and (2.17) are replaced by the
first order condition and participation constraint of the risk-neutral contract, or
equations (2.3) and (2.8) respectively. The rest of the equations are the same for
both cases, except for the equation describing the evolution of net worth (equation
(2.28)), where the repayment rate is given by ω¯ for the risk-neutral case, and ωˆ
for the risk-averse case. Details on the parametrization of the model is included in
appendix 5.3
49
Figure 2.10: Effects of a Positive Productivity Shock
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2.3.1 Productivity Shock
Impulse response analysis shows that the private equity premium amplifies
the impact of a small real aggregate productivity shock and makes its effects signifi-
cantly more persistent. In particular, Figure 2.10 shows impulse response functions
for output, capital, consumption, the private equity premium, and other variables,
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resulting from an unexpected, one-time, positive technology shock.11
Following a positive productivity shock, output as well as consumption rise in
the first period as a result of higher productivity and labor employment, but there
is no initial difference between the benchmark case and the risk-aversion case, as the
private equity premium affects investment decisions only with a one-period lag. In
subsequent periods, however, the increase in output is higher for the risk-averse case.
The amplification can be explained by the behavior of the private equity premium.
In the short-term, the increase in entrepreneurial profits and net worth produces
an increase in entrepreneur’s guaranteed consumption, which in turn generates a
decrease in the private equity premium. As a result, capital investment increases in
the second period, intensifying the initial effect of the positive technological shock.
The effects of this one-time shock die out as higher capital implies a decrease in the
real rental rate of capital, which decreases profits, as one may observe in equation
(2.28). In addition, in the risk averse case, the greater increase in the aggregate
demand driven by the surge in investment and consumption, push up the economy’s
price level and thus decrease the real interest rate.
Higher levels of entrepreneurial profits and net worth produce a slower con-
vergence of the private equity premium to the steady state. As a result, capital
investment, and thus output and consumption, remain persistently higher in the
risk-averse case as compared to the risk-neutral case.
Notice that, as a response of the shock, the repayment rate ωˆ behaves quali-
tatively different between the risk-neutral and the risk-averse cases. In particular,
11Additional impulse response functions can be found in appendix 5.4.
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following the favorable shock, ωˆ decreases for the case of risk-neutral entrepreneurs,
while it increases for the risk-averse case. Put differently, given that an increase in
ωˆ makes default more likely, entrepreneurial default turns out to be countercyclical
under risk neutrality and procyclical under risk aversion. Note that, unlike for the
risk-neutral case, debt default from risk-averse entrepreneurs is not equivalent to
bankruptcy. Changes in the default cutoff (ωˆ) mean that risk is shared differently
in the sense that, as shocks impact net worth, they are also changing the insurance
XtNt. More explicitly, after a favorable shock, the corresponding increase in net
worth implies that for entrepreneurs to provide maximum equity participation, they
require a higher level of insurance. For lenders, this extra cost can only be achieved
through higher debt repayment. Recall that ωˆ includes the cost of providing insur-
ance, therefore when the value of the insured good increases, so does the insurance
premium and, thus, the repayment rate ωˆ charged by the lender.
2.3.2 Monetary Shock
For monetary shocks to have real effects, the model must display some sort
of nominal rigidity. I assume that nominal wages are determined one period in
advance. In order to provide a framework for nominal wage rigidities, I assume that
workers can distinguish the services they provide at no significant cost and therefore
engage in monopolistic competition (Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977).
Assume that there is a unit mass of workers defined by a CES aggregate:
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Lt =
[ ∫ 1
0
L
σ−1
σ
it di
] σ
σ−1 , σ > 1 (2.47)
where σ denotes the intratemporal elasticity of demand for each worker’s services.
Additionally, each worker i maximizes his lifetime utility over consumption and
leisure, as in the homogeneity case,
Et−1
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
logCit − σ − 1
συ
Lυit
]
subject to worker i ’s budget constraint
PtCit +Dit+1 = witLit + (1 + ρt)Dit
I assume that work is indivisible, therefore under this context, workers choose
either to work or not, depending on whether the heterogeneous wages they face are
greater or lower than the value of their marginal disutility of working. If wages
were flexible, each worker would sign a contract for one period at the wage wit that
satisfies his individual labor optimality condition. Since each would commit himself
to work at that wage rate, everyone would work, and it would be therefore true that
aggregate employment Lt = 1.
However, under sticky wages each worker signs a fixed nominal wage contract
every period before the realization of stochastic shocks. Workers choose their wages
for the next period wi,t+1 and commit to providing their services at that wage
rate. I assume workers set wages so that their optimality conditions are satisfied
in expectation. However, given that workers face an downward sloping demand for
labor, an unfavorable shock would reduce the demand for workers would, at fixed
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wages there would be unemployment and L would be less than 1. In the following
period wages would adjust to the new situation, and under the absence of further
shocks unemployment would disappear. This implies that aggregate employment
only in expectation would be equal to the fixed unit mass of workers:
Et−1Lυt = 1 (2.48)
The aggregate version of the workers’ budget constraint is the same as in the
homogeneity case.12
On the production side, the representative firm’s maximization problem is
given by
PtYt −RtKt −
∫ 1
0
witLit di
where wit is the nominal wage paid to worker i. The optimality condition for hiring
an individual worker is given by:
Pt(1− α)Yt
Lt
L
1/σ
t L
−1/σ
it = wit (2.49)
Aggregating over workers, I obtain
Lt
[ ∫ 1
0
w1−σit di
] 1
1−σ = (1− α)PtYt
which implies that the aggregate wage (Wt) in this model can be expressed as
12This can be obtained by summing equation (2.23) over i,
PtCt +Dt+1 =
∫ 1
0
witLit di+ (1 + ρt)Dt
where Ct and Dt are aggregate consumption and aggregate savings, respectively.
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Wt =
[ ∫ 1
0
w1−σit di
] 1
1−σ (2.50)
Figure 2.11: Effects of a Negative Monetary Shock
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Therefore, the firm’s optimality conditions for capital and aggregate labor
demand are the same as in the homogenous case (equations (2.20) and (2.21)),
while the optimal level of labor demanded for an individual worker i is given by:
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Lit =
[wit
Wt
]−σ
Lt (2.51)
Figure 2.11 presents impulse responses for this model to a sudden, unexpected
increase in the safe nominal interest rate (ρt+1).
13 An increase in ρt+1 pushes up
the lender’s opportunity cost per unit of capital borrowed. This implies that the
lender requires a higher external finance premium. As a result, entrepreneur’s prof-
its, and thus entrepreneurial net worth, are reduced as the value of debt repayment
increases, as shown by equations (2.27) and (2.28). Hence, in subsequent peri-
ods, entrepreneurs’ guaranteed consumption falls and the private equity premium
increases. Consequently, capital investment decreases in the second period, ampli-
fying the initial effect of the adverse monetary shock. The effect dies out as the
lower supply of capital and its resulting higher real rental partly offset the impact
of the negative shock by increasing the entrepreneurial sector’s net worth.
Similar to what we observed in the case of a productivity shock, the increased
investment and consumption arising from the effects of the shock imply a persistent
drop in the price level and an increase in the real interest rate on top of the initial rise
in the risk-free rate. Additionally, the monetary shock generates more persistence
and volatility in the risk averse case than in the risk neutral case. Therefore, this
model suggests that business cycles should be longer and more volatile in economies
where non-publicly traded firms are relatively more important in the private sec-
tor, as compared to economies where publicly-traded private firms are relatively
13As before I find that entrepreneurial risk aversion amplifies and propagates this shock over
time, relative to the benchmark model with risk neutrality.
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more important. Though beyond the scope of this work, it would be an interesting
empirical exercise to test this prediction.
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Chapter 3
Model under Small Open Economies
3.1 Introduction
This section extends the model above by analyzing risk aversion and financial
frictions in a small open economy. The main differences arise from the existence
of international capital flows and international trade. Also, the domestic economy
takes international prices as given, including the interest rate and goods prices. As
commonly observed in emerging markets, I assume that this economy exports the
goods that it produces and imports the goods necessary for the production of capi-
tal. In addition, domestic entrepreneurs engage in debt contracts with international
lenders, a phenomenon commonly referred to in the literature as liability dollariza-
tion. Therefore, exchange rates play a key role, both in the financial sector and the
real sector. For instance, a nominal depreciation of the local currency has both the
positive effect of boosting exports and the negative impact of increasing the nominal
value of the outstanding debt.
I analyze these topics under two scenarios. First, I look at an economy with
flexible prices, so that alternative exchange rate regimes impose no real effects, and
examine the effect of exchange rate depreciation or appreciation on the dynamics of
the model, and in particular on the private equity premium. The second scenario
assumes nominal rigidities, so that shocks affect the economy differently under a
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flexible as opposed to a fixed exchange rate regime.
The motivation behind this model is that some studies1 have found that even
while incorporating the financial accelerator introduced by Bernanke and Gertler
(1989), a floating exchange rate is superior to a pegged regime in terms of absorbing
real shocks, because it allows faster real exchange rate adjustment. These studies
point out that, in general equilibrium, the favorable impact on exports of devalua-
tions offsets the adverse effect on net worth in the long run. In particular, Ce´spedes,
Chang and Velasco (2001) assert that a converse result (i.e., where a fixed exchange
rate is preferable to free floating) is only possible under unrealistic assumptions on
the parameters of their model.
On the other hand, when the private equity premium is incorporated into
the analysis, the decrease in the entrepreneur’s net worth from devaluations will
increase this sector’s effective risk aversion and the private equity premium. In
response, entrepreneurs adjust their supply of capital to final goods firms, producing
a magnified impact on output, consumption and both entrepreneurial profits and
net worth in subsequent periods.2 I find that fixed exchange rate regimes can be
preferable under conditions less restrictive than those found in previous studies.
In both scenarios I use a setup similar to that used in the closed economy
1See for example Ce´spedes, Chang and Velasco (2001) or Gertler, Gilchrist and Natalucci (2001).
2In addition to these two aspects, the higher volatility associated with flexible exchange rate
regimes–channeled through higher volatility of the value of the debt in domestic currency, and thus
on the level of leverage and risk-premium–can also be translated into a decrease in investment,
since risk-averse entrepreneurs care about volatility in their investment decisions, requiring a higher
return in order for then to finance firm investments.
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framework. In particular, I introduce entrepreneurial risk aversion into a model of
the open economy financial system, and study how this assumption affects both the
optimal contract between foreign lenders and domestic borrowers, and the dynamics
of an open economy dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model.
3.2 The Optimal Contract Model
In this section, I quickly review the optimal contract between an international
lender and a domestic entrepreneur in the context of a small open economy. As
before, the model assumes that there is no aggregate uncertainty, and that risk
averse domestic entrepreneurs that finance their investments with both internal net
worth and foreign borrowing from international risk neutral lenders. That is, foreign
debt (Bjt+1) equals total investment minus the firm’s net worth (N
j
t+1):
StB
j
t+1 = QtK
j
t+1 − PtN jt (3.1)
where Bjt+1 is denominated in foreign currency, N
j
t is denominated in terms of the
domestic good (whose price is Pt), Qt is the domestic price of capital (explained in
more detail in Section 3.3), and St is the nominal exchange rate.
The contract between borrowers and lenders is subject to the informational
frictions described before. The optimal contract therefore maximizes the entrepreneur’s
utility, subject to the foreign lender’s participation constraint, taking as given prices,
the nominal exchange rate, entrepreneurial net worth in that period, and the rental
return to capital for period t+1 (Rt+1), which are endogenized in the general equi-
60
librium model. I will again start with the standard case where all agents are risk
neutral, then analyze the case where entrepreneurs are risk-averse.
3.2.1 The Benchmark Case
As a benchmark case, this section looks at the optimal contract when there are
only informational frictions, that is, when all actors are risk neutral. The realization
of ωj such that the entrepreneur breaks even is determined by:
ω¯jRt+1K
j
t+1
St+1
= Zjt+1B
j
t+1 (3.2)
where Zjt+1 is the contractual interest rate denominated in foreign currency.
This implies that the entrepreneur j’s expected profits in units of consumption
can be represented by
∫ ∞
ω¯j
ω
Rt+1K
j
t+1
St+1
dH(ω)− [1−H(ω¯j)] ω¯
jRt+1K
j
t+1
St+1
(3.3)
where St+1 is also the price of entrepreneurial consumption as entrepreneurs are
assumed to consume only imports (explained in more detail in Section 3.3).
The lender participation constraint is given by:
[1−H(ω¯j)] ω¯
jRt+1K
j
t+1
St+1
+ (1− µ)
∫ ω¯j
0
ω
Rt+1K
j
t+1
St+1
dH(ω) ≥ (1 + ρt+1)Bjt+1 (3.4)
where (1 + ρt+1) is the international risk-free interest rate.
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The optimality conditions imply the following relationship:
[1−H(ω¯)]
∫ ∞
ω¯
ωRt+1 dH(ω) =
[1−H(ω¯)]St+1
St
(1 + ρt+1)PtNt
Kt+1
+ [1−H(ω¯)]
∫ ∞
ω¯
ω¯Rt+1 dH(ω) + φ (3.5)
where the left hand side of equation 3.5 represents the expected returns in domestic
currency per unit of capital for the entrepreneur, and the right hand side displays the
expected cost per unit of capital for the entrepreneur. This includes the opportunity
cost to the entrepreneur of investing his net worth and the capital repayment rate
(ω¯) for the non-bankruptcy states of nature. The opportunity cost is adjusted by
real depreciation or appreciation of the local currency as realized in period t. The
term φ is negligible and captures the fact that the expected bankruptcy costs change
as ω¯ adjusts.3
Figure 3.1: Supply of capital: the risk-neutral case.
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Figure 3.1 graphs the upward sloping supply of capital, and how it behaves
3φ = µω¯h(ω¯)
∫∞
ω¯
(ω − ω¯)Rt+1 dH(ω).
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before exogenous changes in net worth, bankruptcy costs and a one percent fore-
castable depreciation, measured by the term (St+1/St).
3.2.2 Model with Risk Averse Entrepreneurs
In this section I explore the implications of the optimal contract that arise
from a simple one-period contract when the domestic borrower is risk-averse.
Let ωˆj denote the default cut-off state such that if ωj < ωˆj, the entrepreneur
optimally decides to default, and the lender receives the residual revenues and ob-
serves the realized ωj after paying a positive cost. As in the closed economy case,
the risk-neutral lender provides the risk-averse entrepreneur with a state invariant
insurance XtPtNt, where Xt is the fraction of the entrepreneur’s initial nominal
net worth that is guaranteed. If instead ωj > ωˆj, there is no default, and the en-
trepreneur keeps the true realization of ωj as private information. Therefore, the
entrepreneur maximizes
∫ ωˆj
0
U
(
XjtPtN
j
t
St+1
)
dH(ω) +
∫ ∞
ωˆj
U
(
ωjRt+1K
j
t+1 − Zjt+1Bjt+1
St+1
)
dH(ω)
where ωˆj solves
U
(
XjtPtN
j
t
St+1
)
= U
(
ωˆjRt+1K
j
t+1 − Zjt+1Bjt+1
St+1
)
Thus, the entrepreneur’s expected utility can be re-expressed as
∫ ωˆj
0
U
(
XjtPtN
j
t
St+1
)
dH(ω) +
∫ ∞
ωˆj
U
(
XjtPtN
j
t + (ω
j − ωˆj)Rt+1Kjt+1
St+1
)
dH(ω) (3.6)
where ωˆj also represents the repayment rate per unit of capital in the non-default
states.
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The lender’s participation constraint is given by
∫ ωˆj
0
(1−µ)
[
ωRt+1K
j
t+1
St+1
]
dH(ω)+
∫ ∞
ωˆj
[
ωˆRt+1K
j
t+1
St+1
]
dH(ω)−X
j
tPtN
j
t
St+1
≥ (1+ρt+1)Bjt+1
(3.7)
Taking as given N jt , Rt+1, St, St+1, and Pt, the first order conditions of the
optimal contract with respect to Kt+1 and ωˆ are given by equations (3.8) and (3.9),
respectively.
∫ ∞
ωˆ
(ω − ωˆ) dH(ω)Rt+1 =
[
1 +
E(U ′( )| ω < ωˆ)
E(U ′( )| ω > ωˆ)
][
(1 + ρt+1)PtNt
Kt+1
St+1
St
− XtPtNt
Kt+1
]
− Rt+1
E(U ′( )| ω > ωˆ) Cov{U
′( ), ω} (3.8)
[
1 +
E(U ′( )| ω < ωˆ)
E(U ′( )| ω > ωˆ)
]
=
1
[1−H(ωˆ)]− µωˆh(ωˆ) (3.9)
which, after some algebraic manipulation, imply the following optimality condition:
XtPtNt
Kt+1
+ [1−H(ωˆ)]
∫ ∞
ωˆ
ωRt+1 dH(ω) =
St+1
St
(1 + ρt+1)PtNt
Kt+1
+ [1−H(ωˆ)]
∫ ∞
ωˆ
ωˆRt+1 dH(ω)
− [1−H(ωˆ)− µωˆh(ωˆ)]
E(U ′( )| ω > ωˆ) · Cov{U
′( ), ωRt+1}+ ϕ (3.10)
In equilibrium, the marginal benefit of investing in capital (left hand side)
equals its marginal cost (right hand side). As in the closed-economy framework,
the marginal cost includes the covariance between the return to capital and the
entrepreneur’s marginal utility of consumption: the private equity premium. The
term ϕ, as in the risk-neutral case, captures the change in expected default costs
due to changes in ωˆ.4
4ϕ = µωˆh(ωˆ)
[ ∫∞
ωˆ
(ω − ωˆ)Rt+1 dH(ω) + Cov{U
′( ),ω}
E
(
U ′( )| ω>ωˆ
) ].
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Numerical Approach
Here, as in section 2.1.1, I try to identify the most important features of
the modified financial contract, and present results on the quantitative impact of
parameter changes.
Figure 3.2: Supply of Capital, Marginal Cost Function and Insurance Rate.
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Figure 3.2 shows the simulated behavior of some variables of interest for dif-
ferent values of the exogenous rental rate of capital under the benchmark parameter
values (solid lines), and the impact of changes in these parameters (dashed lines).
Column I shows the supply of capital to final goods firms as a function of the ex-
65
ogenous rental rate on capital. The supply curve of capital depends in part on the
entrepreneur contractual cost of funds Zjt+1 as a function of the return to capital,
arising from equation (3.2), and is shown in column II of Figure 3.2. Finally, column
III shows insurance per unit of net worth (Xjt ) for different values of the return of
capital.
Row (a) of Figure 3.2 shows the effects of different levels of the bankruptcy
parameter (µ); row (b) analyzes the effect of a 20 percent increase in net worth
(from 2 to 2.4); while row (c) examines the impact of varying the coefficient of
risk-aversion. The interpretation of the impact of these changes on the equilibrium
features of the optimal contract are the same as in the closed economy framework
discussed in section 2.1.
Row (e) of Figure 3.2 shows the impact of a one percent forecastable depre-
ciation, measured by the term (St+1/St). Note that while the contract calls for
payment in foreign currency, the lender still has to care about the value of local cur-
rency, since the lender provides the domestic entrepreneur with financing in period
t and receive revenues (including default revenues) in period t + 1. In particular,
an increase in the exchange rate in period t + 1 relative to the previous period re-
duces the value of lender revenues relatively to the opportunity costs of funds. As a
consequence, the supply of capital (column I) shift up by one percent. In addition,
the contractual gross interest rate Zjt+1 equals 1 for values of Rt+1 where there is
no borrowing, an increases 1% with respect to the base case (starts at 1.01 instead
of 1.00) as soon as the entrepreneur relies on external financing. A higher cost of
funds implies lower insurance provided by the lender for each level of Rt+1.
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3.3 The General Equilibrium Model
This section analyzes the aggregate effects of the optimal contract described
in last section on the dynamics of a small open economy. As noted earlier, I first
consider an economy with flexible prices, followed by an economy with nominal
rigidities. By introducing price rigidities I can analyze the different effect of shocks
on the model’s dynamics under flexible or fixed exchange rate regime.
Consider a small open economy whose domestic firms produce one good through
a standard constant return to scale Cobb-Douglas production function:
Yt = AtK
α
t L
1−α
t (3.11)
The good can either be consumed inland or exported. The representative firm
maximizes nominal profits denominated in domestic currency by optimally choosing
capital, labor and total output.
PtYt −RtKt −WtLt
where Pt is the price of domestic output, Rt is the nominal domestic rental rate of
capital and Wt is the nominal wage paid to workers. All prices are denominated in
local currency.
The optimality conditions are standard:
Rt
Pt
= α
Yt
Kt
(3.12)
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Wt
Pt
= (1− α)Yt
Lt
(3.13)
Workers maximize utility over consumption and leisure,
Et−1 logCt − σ − 1
συ
Lυt
where Ct = [θ
θ(1− θ)(1−θ)]−1(CHt )θ(CFt )(1−θ) is a CES aggregate of domestic goods
(CH) and foreign goods (CF ), θ is the weight of the domestic good in total con-
sumption, and υ is the elasticity of labor supply.
I assume for simplicity that workers cannot save or borrow. This assumption
is necessary to avoid the possibility that entrepreneurs could borrow from workers
(through banks) in domestic currency. Workers solve a static problem, subject to a
budget constraint where the only source of income are labor proceeds that is entirely
consumed within the period.
WtLt = PtC
H
t + StC
F
t
Assuming that the law of one price holds and taking the price of the foreign
good P ∗t is taken as a numeraire, the domestic price of imports is also the nominal
exchange rate (that is, P Ft = St).
From consumption cost minimization, taking into account the definition of
aggregate consumption Ct, the following optimality conditions can be obtained:
PtC
H
t = θP
θ
t S
1−θ
t Ct, StC
F
t = (1− θ)P θt S1−θt Ct
Therefore, the relevant cost of consumption can be expressed as the following
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function.
Qt = P
θ
t S
1−θ
t (3.14)
From the worker’s maximization problem, the aggregate budget constraint can
be expressed as:
QtCt = WtLt (3.15)
The labor supply condition is given by:
Wt
QtCt
=
(σ − 1
σ
)
Lυ−1t (3.16)
The entrepreneurial sector is modeled similarly to the closed economy case.
Therefore, analogous to equation (2.7) and assuming for simplicity that entrepreneurs
transform domestic and foreign consumption goods to produce capital in the same
proportion as workers purchase goods for consumption, it is true that
PtNt + StBt+1 = QtKt+1 (3.17)
The resulting condition describing the aggregate equity in domestic currency
accrued by the entrepreneurial sector from renting capital to operating firms similar
to that in the closed economy case:
Vt+1 = Rt+1Kt+1 − (1 + ρt+1)St+1Bt+1 − µ
∫ ωˆ
0
ωRt+1Kt+1 dH(ω) (3.18)
Notice that under these assumptions of preferences, the labor supply is con-
stant. In addition, assuming the same two-period overlapping generation model for
the entrepreneurial sector as above, the real net worth and consumption of young
entrepreneurs at period t can be defined as
Nt = δ
{
(Rt/Pt)Kt − (1 + ρt) St/Pt
St−1/Qt−1
Bt − µ
∫ ωˆ
0
ω(Rt/Pt)Kt dH(ω)
}
(3.19)
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StC
E
t =
1− δ
δ
PtNt (3.20)
assuming for simplicity that entrepreneurs consume only imports.
Figure 3.3: Exchange Rate, the External Finance Premium and the Private Equity.
The effect of a shock on the net worth dynamics and, thus, on the evolution
of the external finance premium and the private equity premium are schematically
presented in Figure 3.3. An international interest rate shock, for instance, will be
translated in an immediate decrease in planned capital investment, as lenders in-
creases their external finance charge to entrepreneurs due to higher opportunity
costs. The implied capital outflows is translated into a devaluation of the local
currency, which reduces the entrepreneur’s net worth by increasing the domestic
currency value of debt repayment (captured by St
Pt
in equation (3.19)), due to the
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fact that debt is denominated in foreign currency. As a consequence, both the ex-
ternal finance premium and the private equity premium increase, further impacting
planned investment decisions and the real exchange rate. That is, in the first period,
the shock together with entrepreneurial risk aversion produce a magnified effect on
capital investment and the real exchange rate.
In the second period, once the drop in capital inflows occur, the real exchange
rate quickly adjusts back, which for the risk averse case, it produces an overshooting
response due to the stronger depreciation in the first period. This appreciation, in
turn, positively affects entrepreneurs’ profits (Vt) by decreasing the value of the
debt repayment This effect works against the direct effect of the shock and of lower
capital investment, on net worth, thus reducing the propagating effect of shocks.
Therefore, the impact of shocks coupled with the presence of the private equity
premium is that it produces magnified, however less persistent, responses of capital
investment and output.
The monetary side of the benchmark flexible-price model is given by a mone-
tary authority that uses its policy instruments to keep the price level constant while
letting the nominal exchange rate fluctuate.
The model is closed with a market clearing condition that must be satisfied
each period. Recalling that θQtCt and θQtKt+1 correspond to the domestically
produced part of consumption and investment, then the home goods market is in
equilibrium when:
PtYt = θQt(Kt+1 + Ct) + StXt (3.21)
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where Xt corresponds to exports, which are assumed to be exogenous to the model.
Note that having the domestic goods market in equilibrium guarantees an equilib-
rium in the trade balance:
(1− θ)Qt(Kt+1 + Ct) = StXt
Equivalently,
Qt(Kt+1 + Ct) = θQt(Kt+1 + Ct) + StXt (3.22)
To see that this condition holds, summing equations (3.15) and (3.15), one
gets:
WtLt + PtNt +QtKt+1 = Qt(Kt+1 + Ct)
Note that the left hand side of the last equation captures all sources of income,
therefore it is true that
PtYt = Qt(Kt+1 + Ct)
which by using equation (3.22), we get
PtYt = θQt(Kt+1 + Ct) + StXt
which is the same as equation (3.21).
Therefore, the risk-neutral rational expectations stochastic dynamic general
equilibrium is given by equations (3.4), (3.3), (3.11), (3.12), (3.13), (3.14), (3.15),
(3.16), (3.17), (3.19) and (3.21) and assumptions on the processes for stochastic vari-
ables, that solve for Yt, Lt, Kt+1, Qt, St, Rt, ω¯t, Wt, Nt, Dt+1, and Ct. Similarly, the
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risk-averse rational expectations stochastic dynamic general equilibrium is defined
by equations (3.7), (3.8), (3.9), (3.11), (3.12), (3.13), (3.14), (3.15), (3.16), (3.17),
(3.19) and (3.21), along with an assumption on the processes for the stochastic
variables, solving for Yt, Lt, Kt+1, Qt, St, Rt, ωˆt, Wt, Xt, Nt, Dt+1, and Ct.
3.4 Numerical Analysis under Flexible Prices
In this section I will study the effects of small one-time shocks to international
interest rates and export demand on some macroeconomic variables of interest. I
assume that these shocks follow an AR(1) process with an autocorrelation coefficient
of 0.9, which is known by all agents. As in previous sections, I analyze the impulse
response functions that result from numerically solving the complete system, differ-
entiating the case where the private equity premium is considered (continuous line)
from the benchmark risk-neutral case (dashed line).
International Interest Rate Shock
Figure 3.4 shows the impact of a 1% increase in the international interest rate
ρt+1 at time t. As implied by equation (3.21), the direct effect is that there is an
instantaneous real depreciation due to the immediate fall in entrepreneurs’ planned
capital investment Kt+1 as a response to the interest rate shock. This implies that
there is a decrease in entrepreneurs’ net worth at time t since the domestic currency
value of foreign debt repayment increases when the real exchange rate rises. For
the risk averse case, the resulting fall in entrepreneurial net worth translates into
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Figure 3.4: Effects of an Unfavorable International Interest Rate Shock
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a rise in the private equity premium, and thus a reinforced decrease in the supply
of capital and foreign borrowing. This depreciates the local currency even more,
further impacting net worth and capital investment. In the following period, there
is a quicker and stronger exchange rate recovery due to the large drop in output in
period t+ 1 under risk aversion (see equation 3.21).
This feature of the real exchange rate can be observed in Figure 3.4. In
addition, as explained before, such a shock increases directly decreases the en-
trepreneurial net worth, since it raises the opportunity cost of lending, thereby
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reducing the supply of funds available for entrepreneurs (recall that entrepreneurs
face an upward sloping marginal cost of funds function).
For the risk aversion case, the described path of the real exchange rate implies
that entrepreneurial net worth experiences a sharper initial decrease and a more
rapid return to the steady state. Capital and output respond accordingly. That is,
for the risk aversion case, there is a sharper decrease of both capital and output in
the second period following the increase in the private equity premium, and a quick
recovery afterwards.
To sum up, the private equity premium amplifies the impact of the interest
rate shock. However, quick recoveries fostered by exchange rate overshooting and
its effect on the value of debt, net worth and, thus, the private equity premium,
imply that shocks have less persistent effect than in the risk neutral case.
Export Demand Shock
In this section, I analyze the effect of a 1% decrease in the demand from the rest
of the world for the domestic good. A decrease in the demand for exports produces
an initial real depreciation of the domestic currency, as implied by equation (3.21).
This real depreciation decreases the level of entrepreneurs’ net worth, as it increases
the domestic currency value of the foreign stock of debt. This, in turn, raises the
private equity premium and decreases the supply of capital, further depreciating
the exchange rate. Given that for the risk-averse case output contracts rapidly in
period t + 1, the exchange rate adjusts quickly to its steady state path, producing
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a rapid recovery of net worth to its steady state value. Consequently, the private
equity premium, the capital supply and the rental rate of capital converge rapidly
to their steady state path, as observed in Figure 3.5.
Figure 3.5: Effects of a Positive Export Shock
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It is also possible to observe in this exercise that shocks are amplified due
to the presence of the private equity premium. However, the exchange rate plays
a stabilizing role by allowing for a faster convergence to the steady state path,
decreasing the persistence due to the private equity premium.
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3.5 Analysis under Nominal Rigidities
In this section I look at an economy with nominal rigidities, so that alternative
exchange rate regimes impose real effects on the economy. Specifically, I examine
how the faster real exchange rate adjustment associated with a flexible exchange
rate regime may impact the economy, in particular entrepreneurs’ net worth and
on the private equity premium. This analysis will help further explore under what
conditions a certain exchange rate regime might outperform the other.
In this section, I use the same structure of nominal rigidities described in
Section 2.3.2. That is, nominal wages are determined one period in advance and
there is heterogeneity in workers so that they enjoy some monopolistic competition
in the labor services they provide. I assume that there is a unit mass of workers
defined by a CES aggregate Lt =
[ ∫ 1
0 L
σ−1
σ
it di
] σ
σ−1 , where each worker i maximizes
lifetime utility over an aggregation of domestic and foreign goods consumption Cit
(as defined in section 3.3) and leisure,
Et−1
[
logCit − σ − 1
συ
Lυit
]
subject to worker i ’s budget constraint
WtLit = PtC
H
it + StC
F
it
Consumption decisions follow the same logic as in Section 3.3 and are governed
by equations (3.14) and (3.15). On the other hand, workers’ labor decisions are
simpler. They decide whether to work or not depending on how the heterogeneous
wages they face and the value of their marginal disutility of working compare one
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to the other. As explained in section 2.3.2, in the absence of shocks, all workers
work at their desired wage rates. However, when wages are sticky and the economy
is subject to an unexpected shock, each worker’s wage and his marginal disutility of
working are not necessarily equal, at least in the period in which the shock occurs.
Therefore, only in expectation it is true that all workers decide to provide their
services.
Et−1Lυt = 1 (3.23)
The difference between exchange rate regimes stems from the monetary au-
thority’s choice to either let the nominal exchange rate (St) fluctuate and pursue
price targeting, or to aim for a constant nominal exchange rate, while letting do-
mestic prices fluctuate.
Flexible Exchange Rate Regime
Price targeting implies that the monetary authority maintains Pt at its steady
state value. Therefore, in period 0 (when the shock takes place), nominal wages are
fixed, and aggregate labor demand is determined by
Lt = (1− α)PYt
Wt
(3.24)
where P is the steady state value of Pt.
For later periods, however, in the absence of further unexpected shocks, work-
ers find jobs that offer wages that satisfy their optimality conditions. Under these
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conditions, aggregate labor is constant and equal to one. In addition, wages are
defined as
Wt+1 = (1− α)PYt+1 (3.25)
Therefore, the rational expectations stochastic dynamic general equilibrium
for the risk-neutral case is given by equations (3.3), (3.4), (3.11), (3.12), (3.14),
(3.15), (3.17), (3.19), (3.21), (3.24) and (3.25), and assumptions on the processes
for stochastic variables, that solve for Yt, Lt,Kt+1, Qt, St, Rt, ω¯t,Wt+1, Nt, Dt+1, and
Ct. For the risk-averse case, these are given by equations (3.7), (3.8), (3.9), (3.11),
(3.12), (3.14), (3.15), (3.17), (3.19), (3.21), (3.24) and (3.25), the assumption on the
processes for the stochastic variables, solving for Yt, Lt, Kt+1, Qt, St, Rt, ωˆt, Wt+1,
Xt, Nt, Dt+1, and Ct.
Fixed Exchange Rate Regime
Under this regime, the monetary authority maintains the nominal exchange
rate St constant at its steady state value, allowing prices to freely fluctuate. Thus,
as of period 0, aggregate labor demand is given by
Lt = (1− α)PtYt
Wt
(3.26)
For later periods, there is equilibrium without unemployment, where L = 1
and wages are defined as
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Wt+1 = (1− α)Pt+1Yt+1 (3.27)
The rational expectations stochastic dynamic general equilibrium for the risk-
neutral case is given by equations (3.3), (3.4), (3.11), (3.12), (3.14), (3.15), (3.17),
(3.19), (3.21), (3.26) and (3.27), and assumptions on the processes for stochastic
variables, that solve for Yt, Lt,Kt+1, Qt, Pt, Rt, ω¯t,Wt+1, Nt, Dt+1, and Ct. Likewise,
for the risk-averse case the equations that define the rational expectations stochastic
dynamic general equilibrium are (3.7), (3.8), (3.9), (3.11), (3.12), (3.14), (3.15),
(3.17), (3.19), (3.21), (3.26) and (3.27), the assumption on the processes for the
stochastic variables, solving for Yt, Lt, Kt+1, Qt, Pt, Rt, ωˆt, Wt+1, Xt, Nt, Dt+1, and
Ct.
3.5.1 Exchange Rate Regime Comparison
In this section I compare how the two alternative exchange rate regimes impact
the response and dynamics of aggregate variables after a real shock. I do this by
analyzing the impulse response functions for both a fixed exchange rate regime and
a flexible exchange rate regime, subject to separate shocks to international interest
rates and export demand.
In order to contrast the results for risk-averse entrepreneurs to those found
in the literature, I also examine the dynamics of the model if the supply of capital
defined by the optimality conditions from the risk neutral contract (equations 3.3
and 3.4) are replaced by the specification followed by Ce´spedes, Chang and Velasco
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(2000) (CCV, henceforth). These authors assume that the supply of capital is
determined by the following relationship, which was derived by Bernanke, Gertler
and Gilchrist (1999).
Rt+1
ρt+1
= F
[
1 +
StBt+1
PtNt+1
]
(3.28)
That is, the wedge between the domestic rental rate of capital and the risk-free rate,
referred to as the risk premium, is a positive function of the ratio debt to net worth
(or leverage).
Due to the assumptions on preferences, under flexible wages the labor sup-
plied by workers is constant regardless of the exchange rate regime. However, for
the case of sticky wages and a fixed exchange rate regime, the demand for labor,
represented by the log-linear version of the firm’s first order condition with respect
to employment, is given by
lt =
1
α
pt
Therefore, the initial decrease in prices after an adverse shock (recall that real
depreciation under fixed exchange rate regimes is accomplished through domestic
price deflation) would imply a drop in the demand for labor. At constant wages in
the first period, the consequence is that there is unemployment and a fall in output.
In the second period, wages adjust down and unemployment disappears. As we
can see, under fixed exchange rate regimes the initial drop in output comes from
the nominal wage rigidity assumption, not from frictions resulting from imperfect
information and entrepreneurial risk aversion. Given that the effect of shocks on
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investment decisions can be observed from the second period on, I will focus my
analysis there.
Figure 3.6: Exchange Rate Regime Comparison: The Case of an International In-
terest Rate Increase and Risk Neutrality
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The Risk-Neutral Case
Figure 3.6 examine the effect of an international interest rate increase for
the benchmark case of risk-neutral entrepreneurs. As explained before, regardless
of whether the nominal exchange rate is held fixed or floats, an increase in the
risk-free interest rate results in a decrease in investment demand, and thus results
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in real depreciation of the local currency. Recall that real depreciation is accom-
plished through nominal depreciation and domestic price deflation for free floating
and pegged exchange rates, respectively.
Figure 3.7: Exchange Rate Regime Comparison: The Case of a Export Demand
Decrease and Risk Neutrality
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The initial drop in output under fixed exchange rate regimes results from
the real depreciation via deflation, which increases real wages, and thus decreases
employment and output. In addition, although real depreciation negatively impacts
net worth, deflation imposes a greater impact on real net worth turns than that
of nominal devaluation. As a consequence, the drop in net worth is greater for
fixed exchange rate regimes. This produces a larger increase in the external finance
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premium and this a greater decrease in capital investment.
Figure 3.7 present the dynamic effects of an unfavorable drop in the external
demand for exports. As noted in previous sections, a drop in exports negatively
affects consumption, generates an immediate decrease in capital investment, and
thus a real depreciation of local currency under both regimes.
Results are similar to those found for the international interest rate shock.
Specifically, depreciation through deflation decreases employment and output. Ad-
ditionally, the greater drop in net worth under fixed exchange rates produces a larger
increase in the external finance premium, and thus an amplified response of capital
and output.
To sum up, the optimal response of risk-neutral entrepreneurs as developed
in section 3.2.1 implies that the conventional wisdom stands, as flexible exchange
rate regimes are better insulator of real shocks than fixed exchange rate regimes.
This result occurs as domestic deflation imposes a direct impact on real wages and
relatively greater effects on real net worth, than nominal depreciation.
The CCV Risk-Premium Case
This section discusses the effect of the shocks analyzed in previous sections
when the risk-neutral specification is instead given by equation (3.28). The resulting
impulse response functions are shown in Figures 3.8 and 3.9.
Results are qualitatively equivalent in the sense that the real depreciation
arising from these shocks negatively affect the entrepreneurial net worth, and this
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Figure 3.8: Exchange Rate Regime Comparison: CCV Risk Premium and the Case
of an International Interest Rate Increase
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drop in net worth is greater for fixed exchange rate regimes. Therefore, for pegged
exchange rates, the larger increase in the external finance premium together with the
initial drop in employment as a consequence of domestic price deflation, generates
an amplified response of output to shocks. Consequently, as also shown by Ce´spedes
et al (2000), the conventional wisdom holds for this case as well.
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Figure 3.9: Exchange Rate Regime Comparison: CCV and the Case of a Export
Demand Decrease and Risk Aversion
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The Risk-Averse Case
Figures 3.10 and 3.11 show the impulse response functions resulting from the
same unfavorable shocks, when the entrepreneurs are risk averse. Both shocks pro-
duce a real depreciation of the local currency as a consequence of the drop in capital
inflows due to the lower domestic investment demand. The drop in net worth as a
consequence of depreciation not only produces an increase in the external finance
premium, but also raises the private equity premium, and thus reduces the capital
supply. This amplified response of capital investment produces a much larger real
depreciation under flexible exchange rates than under fixed rates, further decreasing
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net worth and capital.
Figure 3.10: Exchange Rate Regime Comparison: The Case of an International
Interest Rate Increase and Risk Aversion
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As a result, the real depreciation and the drop in net worth is significantly
larger under flexible rates, producing an sharper response of capital and output
than when the exchange rate is pegged. Therefore, output and investment volatility
is considerably higher when the exchange rate freely floats. On the other hand, given
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Figure 3.11: Exchange Rate Regime Comparison: The Case of a Export Demand
Decrease and Risk Aversion
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that the real exchange rate responses to shocks is much larger for the floating than
for fixed exchange rate regimes, the subsequent faster exchange rate recovery fosters
quick output and capital recovery. This implies that for these cases, persistence of
shocks is significantly reduced.
To sum up, real exchange rate flexibility may be beneficial for an economy in
the sense that it helps absorb the negative effects of unfavorable real shocks through
the expansionary effect of real depreciation on exports. However, this model suggests
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that this higher flexibility comes at a cost, which is that there is higher real exchange
rate volatility. This volatility negatively impacts the profits of the capital producing
entrepreneurial sector through a higher private equity premium, and thus produces
more pronounced responses of capital and output to real shocks. Therefore, when
entrepreneurial risk aversion is considered, the conventional wisdom does not hold.
In welfare terms as measured by the path followed by consumption, notice
that it is no longer clear that flexible exchange rates outperform fixed rates, since
consumption experiences a larger decrease under free floating, although it more
quickly returns to the steady state. The policy implications are that fixed exchange
rate regimes may have benefits for economies with deficient levels of information
technology, or with a relatively less active corporate sector.
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Chapter 4
Conclusion
As we have seen, the behavior of the entrepreneurial sector can act as an
additional mechanism that magnifies and propagates shocks of an economy. Re-
laxing the simplifying assumption that entrepreneurs engaging in debt contracts
are risk-neutral may explain why entrepreneurs in some economies rapidly move
from euphoria during booms to deep depression and stagnation during (even mild)
recessions.
In the microeconomic model, the inclusion of risk aversion has two main con-
sequences. First, the entrepreneur demands insurance as an incentive for taking
on the risk of a new investment. Therefore, the external finance premium that the
lender charges reflects both the cost imposed by the standard agency problems com-
ing from asymmetric information, as well as the cost of providing insurance to the
entrepreneur. Second, the total rental cost paid by final goods firms to use capital
produced by entrepreneurs incorporates not only the external finance premium, but
also the risk premium required by risk-averse entrepreneurs due to the stochastic
nature of their investment returns, or the private equity premium. As a result, for a
given return to capital, risk-averse entrepreneurs are willing to supply less capital,
as the risky nature of such investments implies a decrease in their expected utility.
Sensitivity analysis reveals that the lower the informational frictions, the lower
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the private equity premium, as the lender is more willing to participate in the project
when default costs are low. In the extreme case in which there are no informational
frictions, the lender takes over the project, and executes it in a frictionless envi-
ronment. When net worth is higher, entrepreneurs obtain more insurance in the
optimal contract and the private equity premium is lower, as the effective degree of
risk aversion is lower. As expected, the more volatile the economy and the higher the
level of risk aversion of the entrepreneur, the higher the private equity premium. In
addition, in the small open economy model, a real depreciation of the local currency
reduces lender revenues in dollar terms, holding the opportunity costs of funds con-
stant. As a result, both the supply of capital and the marginal cost of funds curves
shift up.
The main conclusions arising from the analysis of the optimal contract can be
summarized as follows: (i) entrepreneurial risk aversion limits the economy’s capital
supply through the action of the private equity premium; (ii) the private equity
premium is countercyclical since changes in entrepreneurial profits and net worth
affect the effective level of risk aversion and therefore the private equity premium in
the opposite direction; (iii) the presence of asymmetric information is crucial for the
private equity premium to exist. Absence of such frictions implies that risk-neutral
agents, such as lenders, would be willing to execute the entrepreneur’s projects.
In the closed-economy dynamic general equilibrium model with risk averse
entrepreneurs, I show that the effect of real productivity and monetary shocks is
magnified and propagated over time through the private equity premium. A shock
resulting in an increase in profits and in net worth will decrease effective risk aver-
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sion, thereby lowering the private equity premium. In response, entrepreneurs are
willing to supply more capital to final goods firms, producing a positive impact on
output, consumption and both entrepreneurial profits and net worth in subsequent
periods. The opposite occurs if the shock is negative. The endogenous private equity
risk premium causes business cycle fluctuations to be stronger and more persistent
over time. As shocks are propagated and amplified by the private equity premium
when private entrepreneurs are risk averse, this model predicts that economies with
an important private entrepreneurial sector will show more volatile and persistent
business cycles than economies with a private sector composed largely of publicly
traded companies.
When analyzing the effect of asymmetric information and entrepreneurial risk-
aversion in the context of a small open economy and liability dollarization, two
interesting results are found. First, flexible exchange rates alleviate the propagating
feature of the private equity premium. Specifically, the exchange rate overshoots
in anticipation of the expected increase in the private equity premium. As the
exchange rate quickly adjusts back in the following periods, we encounter effects in
the opposite direction on entrepreneurial wealth, and faster recovery of the private
equity premium and investment to their steady state values. Second, by carrying out
an exchange rate regime comparison, I find that the greater volatility associated with
flexible exchange rate regimes adversely impacts the private equity premium, and
thus amplifies the supply of capital and output responses to shocks. In this context,
fixed exchange rate regimes may be preferable under less restrictive conditions than
those conventionally found in the literature.
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The most important conclusions resulting from the general equilibrium analy-
sis are (i) the private equity premium amplifies business cycles, because it becomes
less relevant during booms and more important during recessions; (ii) in a large
closed economy, the private equity premium also reinforces itself and becomes a
mechanism that helps business cycles become more prolonged; (iii) in a small open
economy, the presence of flexile exchange rates somewhat alleviates the autocor-
relation of shocks over time, at the expense of an even more pronounced effect of
shocks on capital and output; (iv) flexible exchange rate regimes, by allowing faster
real exchange rate adjustment, accentuate the volatility feature of the private eq-
uity premium in small open economies; (v) in terms of economic performance, fixed
exchange rate regimes could be preferable under less restrictive conditions than, for
instance, the “unrealistic” set of parameters found by Ce´spedes, Chang and Velasco
(2000).
To sum up, this dissertation suggests an additional reasons for procyclical
entrepreneurial activity, which, in turn, helps explain the magnitude of business cycle
fluctuations that information frictions alone have failed to rationalize. It is knows
that business cycles in some countries are stronger than in others. This dissertation
predicts that economies with a relatively higher share of private companies should
present sharper business cycles, since in this context there is room for a more active
role for entrepreneurs. That is, two economies with equal financial health and real
sector robustness may have different cyclical volatility due to differences in the
ownership structure of the productive sector.
In terms of policy implications, any improvement in information technology
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and transparency in the privately-owned private sector necessarily implies an allevi-
ation in the volatility produced by asymmetric information in the context of private
entrepreneurs. Policies encouraging more established businesses to become public
would accomplish a similar effect. Finally, economies with deficient levels of infor-
mation technologies or with a relatively low share of public companies could benefit
from lower volatility under fixed exchange rate regimes.
An interesting extension of this model would be to test empirically whether
industries, geographic regions, or countries with relatively larger privately-held pri-
vate sectors exhibit more volatile business cycles. Some economies enjoying both a
healthy financial system and a robust private sector may remain stymied in periods
of prolonged recessions following a negative shock while experiencing protracted pe-
riods of euphoria during booms. Such behavior on the part of an economy could be
explained in part by risk-aversion on the part of entrepreneurs.
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Chapter 5
Appendix
5.1 The Private Equity Premium
U ′(Cet+1) =
[
XtNt + (ω − ωˆ)Rt+1Kt+1
]−γ
If we define α = XtNt − ωˆRt+1Kt+1 and β = ωRt+1Kt+1, then
Cov[U ′(Cet+1), ω] = Cov[(α + βω)
−γ, ω] = Cov[f(ω), ω] (B.1)
By a first-order Taylor approximation,
f(X) ≈ (α + βω0)−γ − γ(α+ βX0)−(1+γ)(ω − ω0)
where ω0 is the steady-state value of ω.
Therefore,
Cov[f(ω), ω] ≈ −γ(βω0 + γ)−(1+γ) σω
and so,
Cov[U ′(Cet+1), ω] ≈ −γ
[
XtNt + (1− ωˆ)Rt+1Kt+1
]−(1+γ)
σ2ω (B.2)
Clearly, Cov( ) < 0. Also, ∂EP
∂Nt
< 0.
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5.2 The Log-Linearized Contract
5.2.1 Contract under risk-neutrality
First Order Condition of Contract with Respect to ω¯.
ξfocR rt+1 − ξfocω¯ ω¯t + ξfocρ ρt+1 = 0 (C.1)
where
ξfocR = R
{
[1−H(ω¯ss)]
[
(1− µ)E(ω|ω < ω¯) + E(ω|ω > ω¯)
]
−µω¯ssh(ω¯ss)
[
E(ω|ω > ω¯)− ω¯ss[1−H(ω¯ss)]
]}
ξfocω¯ = ω¯
ss
{
µR h(ω¯ss)ω¯ss[1−H(ω¯ss)]− (1 + ρ)h(ω¯ss)
}
ξfocρ = (1 + ρ)[K −N ]
Lender Participation Constraint.
ξPCR rt+1 + ξ
PC
K kt+1 + ξ
PC
ω¯ ω¯t + ξ
PC
N nt − ξPCρ ρt+1 = 0 (C.2)
where
ξPCR = R
{
(1− µ)E(ω|ω < ω¯)K +K[1−H(ω¯ss)] ω¯ss
}
εPCK = K
{
(1− µ)E(ω|ω < ω¯)R +R[1−H(ω¯ss)] ω¯ss − (1 + ρ)
}
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ξPCω¯ = ω¯
ss
{
RK[1−H(ω¯ss)]− µRK h(ω¯ss)ω¯ss
}
ξPCN = N(1 + ρ)
ξPCρ = (1 + ρ)[1−H(ω¯ss)]
5.2.2 Contract under Risk Aversion
First Order Condition of Contract with Respect to ωˆ.
εωˆXN(xt + nt) + ε
ωˆ
Rrt+1 + ε
ωˆ
Kkt+1 − εωˆωˆωˆt = 0 (C.3)
where
εωˆXN = XN
{
[XN + (1− ωˆss)RK]−(1+γ)[1−H(ωˆss)]2 − (XN)−(1+γ)H(ωˆss)2
}
εωˆR = R
{
γ(1− ωˆss)K[XN + (1− ωˆss)RK]−(1+γ)[1−H(ωˆss)]2
}
εωˆK = K
{
γ(1− ωˆss)R[XN + (1− ωˆss)RK]−(1+γ)[1−H(ωˆss)]2
}
εωˆωˆ = ωˆ
ss
{
γ(1− ωˆss)RK[XN + (1− ωˆss)RK]−(1+γ)[1−H(ωˆss)]2
−(XN)−(1+γ)H(ωˆss)3h(ωˆss)− (XN)−γH(ωˆss)
}
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First Order Condition of Contract with Respect to Kt+1.
εKXN(xt + nt) + ε
K
R rt+1 + ε
K
Kkt+1 − εKωˆ ωˆt + εKρ ρt+1 = 0 (C.4)
where
εKXN = XNγ
{
[(1− ρ)− (1− µ)E(ω|ω < ωˆ)R− E(ω|ω > ωˆ)R]
[XN + (1− ωˆss)RK]−γ[1−H(ωˆss)]
+[(1− ρ)− (1− µ)E(ω|ω < ωˆ)R−Rωˆss[1−H(ωˆss)]](XN)−(1+γ)H(ωˆss)
+R[XN + (1− ωˆss)RK]−(1+γ) 1 + γ
XN + (1− ωˆss)RK σ
2
ω
}
εKR = R
{
[(1− ρ)− (1− µ)E(ω|ω < ωˆ)R− E(ω|ω > ωˆ)R][XN + (1− ωˆss)RK]−γ
[1−H(ωˆss)](1− ωˆss)γK
+
(
(XN)−γH(ωˆss) + [XN + (1− ωˆss)RK]−γ[1−H(ωˆss)]
)
(1− µ)E(ω|ω < ωˆ)
+(XN)−(1+γ)ωˆss[1−H(ωˆss)]
−[γ(XN + (1− ωˆss)RK)]−(1+γ)
[
1− 1 + γ
XN + (1− ωˆss)RK
]
σ2ω
}
εKK = K
{
[(1− ρ)− (1− µ)E(ω|ω < ωˆ)R− E(ω|ω > ωˆ)R][XN + (1− ωˆss)RK]−γ
[1−H(ωˆss)](1− ωˆss)R
+R2γ[XN + (1− ωˆss)RK]−(1+γ) 1 + γ
XN + (1− ωˆss)RK (1− ωˆ
ss) σ2ω
}
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εKωˆ = ωˆ
ss
{
[(1− ρ)− (1− µ)E(ω|ω < ωˆ)R− E(ω|ω > ωˆ)R]
[XN + (1− ωˆss)RK]−γ[1−H(ωˆss)]γRK+
[
(XN)−γH(ωˆss)−
(
(XN)−γH(ωˆss) + [XN + (1− ωˆss)RK]−γ[1−H(ωˆss)]
)
(1− µ)
]
Rh(ωˆss)ωˆss − (XN)−γH(ωˆss)R[1−H(ωˆss)− h(ωˆss)ωˆss]
+R2Kγ[XN + (1− ωˆss)RK]−(1+γ) 1 + γ
XN + (1− ωˆss)RK σ
2
ω
}
εKρ = (1 + ρ)
(
(XN)−γH(ωˆss) + [XN + (1− ωˆss)RK]−γ[1−H(ωˆss)]
)
Lender Participation Constraint.
εPCXN(xt + nt) = ε
PC
R rt+1 − εPCK kt+1 + εPCωˆ ωˆt + εPCN nt − εPCρ ρt+1 (C.5)
where
εPCXN = XN
εPCR = R
{
(1− µ)E(ω|ω < ωˆ)K +K[1−H(ωˆss)] ωˆss
}
εPCK = Y K
εPCωˆ = ωˆ
ssRK[1−H(ωˆss)]
εPCN = N(1 + ρ)
εPCρ = (1 + ρ)[K −N ]
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5.3 Parameterization
In this section I present the values of the parameters used to numerically
simulate this model. Note that this is an exercise intended to shed light on the
qualitative impact of the private equity premium on the model dynamics, and thus
its purpose is not to perform a calibration exercise.
Table 5.1: Parametrization.
Parameter Description Value
α share of capital to output 0.35
γ coefficient of risk aversion 2
β discount factor 0.99
υ labor supply elasticity 1.2
µ bankruptcy cost 0.11
δ entrepreneur saving rate 0.95
κRN risk-neutral capital to net worth ratio 2
I select parameter values in a standard fashion, according to previous literature
when possible. Following Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999), the share of capital
in production is set at 0.35, the discount factor β is set to 0.99,1 and the labor supply
elasticity υ is set at 1.2. In line with Rampini (2003), the constant relative risk-
aversion coefficient is taken to be 2. From Ce´spedes, Chang and Velasco (2000), I
set the default cost parameter to be equal to 0.11. Finally, consistent with both
Bernanke et al. (1999) and Ce´spedes et al (2000), I use an risk-neutral capital to
net worth ratio of 2.
In order to get the implied steady state value of other parameters, I solve for
1Since in the steady state 1 + ρ = β−1 (see equation (2.24)), the risk-free interest rate 1 + ρ
equals 10.99 .
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the steady state of the model. Results turn out to be sensitive to the capital to
net worth, K
N
, that is, proportional changes in K and N do not affect the model.
Having said that, without loss of generality I arbitrarily set NSS = 2. Then, for the
risk-neutral case KSS = 4. The rest of the variables are determined by the following
equations coming from the steady state solution of the model:
RSS =
1
1− µ ∗ E(ω|ω < ωˆ)
[
1 + ρ+
1− δ(1 + ρ)
δ K
SS
NSS
]
(C.6)
BSS = KSS −NSS (C.7)
CSSE =
1− δ
δ
NSS (C.8)
CSS =
1
α
[
(1− α)KSS + (1− α)(1− δ)
δ
NSS + ρBSS
]
(C.9)
Y SS = KSS + CSS + CSSE (C.10)
LSS =
[
(1− α)Y SS)
CSS
] 1
υ
(C.11)
W SS = (1− α)Y
SS
LSS
(C.12)
For the risk-averse case, since there is no known capital to net worth ratio,
I obtain it by following this procedure. Without loss of generality, I maintain the
assumption that NSS = 2. Then I arbitrarily chose a value for the capital to net
worth ratio (say 2, to start). That gives me the corresponding values ofKSS and RSS
from equation (C.6). Then I check whether the resulting (RSS,KSS) par coincides
with one of the points on the capital supply coming from the risk-averse optimal
contract. I adjust the arbitrary value of KSS until converging to the equilibrium
(RSS,KSS) coordinate. This results in an equilibrium capital to net worth ratio equal
101
to 1.55, which is expectedly lower than the risk neutral ratio due to the additional
costs of supplying capital by risk averse entrepreneurs.
Table 5.2 summarizes the implied steady state values of some of those param-
eters.
Table 5.2: Implied steady state values.
Parameter Description Value
κRN risk-averse capital to net worth ratio 1.55
RRN risk-neutral capital rental rate 1.0318
RRA risk-averse capital rental rate 1.0378
PEP private equity premium 0.6%(
D
C
)RN
risk-neutral share of debt to consumption 0.26%(
D
C
)RA
risk-averse share of debt to consumption 0.19%(
WL
C
)RN
risk-neutral share of labor income to consumption 99.74%(
WL
C
)RA
risk-averse share of labor income to consumption 99.81%(
K
Y
)RN
risk-neutral capital to output ratio 0.34(
K
Y
)RA
risk-averse capital to output ratio 0.33(
CE
Y
)RN
risk-neutral entrepreneur consumption to output ratio 0.89%(
CE
Y
)RA
risk-averse entrepreneur consumption to output ratio 1.15%
The resulting steady state capital rental rate for the risk-neutral case is equal
to 1.0318, while for the risk-averse case it corresponds to 1.0378. This implies a
differential of 0.6%, mainly explained by the private equity premium (although it
also includes the insurance cost). The steady state capital to output ratio, K
SS
Y SS
, turns
out to be 0.34 and 0.33 for the risk-neutral and the risk-averse cases, respectively.
Likewise, respectively for both cases, the entrepreneurial consumption to output
ratio are 0.89% and 1.15%. Finally, the resulting share of debt to consumption for
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the risk-neutral case is 0.26%, whereas for the risk-averse case, it is equal to 0.19%.
Robustness Check
I carried out a robustness check to test how sensitive these results are to
changes in some of the parameter values, namely the default cost parameter (µ),
the weight of domestic goods on total consumption (θ), the entrepreneurial saving
rate (δ), the share of capital in production (α) and the risk aversion coefficient (γ).
I do this for the closed economy framework and for a small open economy under
both exchange rate regimes.
Results in general are very insensitive to changes in µ. By examining the
parameter values of the contracts, one may notice that µ is generally multiplied by
very small numbers, considerably reducing its role in determining the equilibrium
variables of the contract. On the other hand, while results are also insensitive to
changes in the entrepreneurial savings rate δ in the risk neutral case, the opposite
is true for the risk averse case. In particular, increases (decreases) in δ produce a
larger (smaller) impact of shocks on output. Intuitively, the higher the savings rate,
the more direct the impact of entrepreneurs’ profits on net worth, adding volatility
that matters more to risk-averse entrepreneurs. For instance, decreases in profits as
a consequence of an adverse shock are translated into larger changes in net worth
the higher the saving rate. Therefore, low values of δ can potentially reverse the
result that risk aversion amplifies shocks. In particular, I find that if δ lies around
0.65 or lower, shocks are stronger if entrepreneurs are risk neutral rather than risk
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averse for the interest rate shock (0.15 for the export shock). Conventional wisdom
does not hold under any value of δ, and the difference between exchange rate regimes
widens as δ rises.
As expected, increases (decreases) in the share of capital in production (α)
increase (decrease) the impact of shocks on output, as capital plays a more (less)
important role. However, variations in endogenous variables due to changes in α
occur in the same direction and similar magnitude so that qualitative results are
not affected. Also as expected, higher levels of risk aversion magnify the impact of
shocks on capital and output. Therefore, potentially low levels of risk aversion can
reverse the result that risk aversion magnifies the effects of shocks. In fact, if the
coefficient of risk aversion is below 0.54, output more strongly respond to shocks
under risk neutrality than under risk aversion for the interest rate shock (0.335 for
the export shock).
Finally, results are sensitive to variations in the share of domestic goods in
total consumption (θ) only under flexible exchange rate regimes. That is, for both
the risk neutral case and the risk averse case, the impact of shocks on output under
free floating exchange rate regimes is greater (less) the lower (higher) θ (or equiv-
alently, the higher (lower) the share of imports in consumption). Under flexible
exchange rates, real depreciation occurs through increases in the nominal exchange
rate, which increases yet more the cost of consumption the higher the importance of
imports in consumption. On the other hand, under pegged rates, real depreciation is
accomplished through domestic deflation, which is slower and imposes a neutralizing
effect as it reduces the cost of consumption. Therefore, lower levels of θ under risk
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neutrality can cause conventional wisdom not to hold, however it does not occur for
any value of θ. In addition, a high θ can potentially result in the opposite outcome
under risk aversion. That is, for conventional wisdom to still hold when risk-averse
entrepreneurs are considered, the value of θ has to be above 0.87 for the interest
rate shock and above 0.92 for the export demand shock.
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5.4 Impulse Response Functions
Figure 5.1: Effects of a Favorable Productivity Shock
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Figure 5.2: Effects of an Adverse Monetary Shock
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5.5 The Log-linearized Small Open Economy Model
Aggregate demand
qt + ct = wt + lt (D.1)
qt = (1− θ)st (D.2)
nt
Qκ
+ (1− 1
Qκ
)(st + bt+1) = (1− θ)(st + kt+1) (D.3)
ξfocR rt+1 − ξfocω¯ ω¯t + ξfocK kt+1 + ξfocN nt + ξfocSt+1 st+1 − ξfocSt st = 0 (D.4)
ξPCR rt+1 + ξ
PC
K kt+1 + ξ
PC
ω¯ ω¯t + ξ
PC
N nt − ξPCSt+1 st+1 + ξPCSt st = 0 (D.5)
εωˆXN(xt + nt) + ε
ωˆ
Rrt+1 + ε
ωˆ
Kkt+1 − εωˆωˆωˆt = 0 (D.6)
εKXN(xt + nt) + ε
K
R rt+1 + ε
K
Kkt+1 − εKωˆ ωˆt + εKS (st+1 − θst) = 0 (D.7)
εPCXN(xt + nt) = ε
PC
R rt+1 − εPCK kt+1 + εPCωˆ ωˆt + εPCN nt − εPCSt+1 st+1 + εPCSt st (D.8)
yt = θ
QK
Y
(qt + kt+1) + θ
QC
Y
(qt + ct) +
SX
Y
(st + xt) (D.9)
Aggregate supply
yt = at + αkt + (1− α)lt (D.10)
rt − pt = yt − kt (D.11)
wt − pt = yt − lt (D.12)
wt − qt − ct = (υ − 1) lt (D.13)
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Evolution of State Variables
Nnt = δ
{
[1− µ E(ω|ω < ωˆ)]RK (rt + kt)− (1 + ρ)B bt − µRωˆ2h(ωˆ) ωˆt
}
(D.14)
The first block of equations represents aggregate demand. Equation (D.1) is
the log-linearized version of the workers’ aggregate budget constraint (3.15).2 In
the steady state, the value consumption (C) must equal the nominal labor income,
where the definition of consumption cost is given by Equation (D.2). Equation
(2.33) describes the entrepreneurs’ borrowing needs given investment and available
net worth, where the parameter κ is the steady-state total investment to net worth
ratio.
Equations (D.4) and (D.5) are the log-linearized form of the risk-neutral con-
tract’s first order condition and the lender participation constraint, respectively.
Similarly, equations (D.6), (D.7) and (D.8) are the log-linearized form of the risk-
averse contract’s first order conditions with respect to ωˆ and Kt+1, and the lender’s
participation constraint, respectively. Given changes in Rt+1, Nt, St+1, and St these
equations jointly determine the deviation from the steady state of capital investment
and the repayment rate (ωˆ). Parameters ξfoci and ξ
PC
i , ε
ωˆ
i , ε
K
i and ε
PC
i are constants
at the steady state that accompany the endogenous variables. More details about
these constants can be found in the next appendix.
Finally, equation (D.9) is the economy-wide resource constraints. Output
changes are explained by changes in investment, consumption and exports, weighted
by their importance in total output at the steady state.
2I normalize the steady state price level to equal 1.
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The second block of equations describes the aggregate supply for this econ-
omy. Specifically, equation (D.10) presents the log-linearized version of the produc-
tion function, while equations (D.11) and (D.12) are the first order conditions from
the firm’s profit maximization problem with respect to capital and labor, respec-
tively. Lastly, equation (D.13) is the linearized version of equation (3.16), and shows
workers’ optimal substitution between consumption and work, taking into account
changes in the price level and wages.
Finally, equation (D.14) introduces the evolution of the model’s state variable,
net worth, as the log-linearized form of equation (3.19).
5.5.1 Contract under risk-neutrality
First Order Condition of Contract with Respect to ω¯.
ξfocR rt+1 − ξfocω¯ ω¯t + ξfocK kt+1 + ξfocN nt + ξfocSt+1 st+1 − ξfocSt st = 0 (E.1)
where
ξfocR = R
{
[1−H(ω¯ss)]
[
(1− µ)E(ω|ω < ω¯) + E(ω|ω > ω¯)
]
−µω¯ssh(ω¯ss)
[
E(ω|ω > ω¯)− ω¯ss[1−H(ω¯ss)]
]}
ξfocω¯ = ω¯
ss
{
µR h(ω¯ss)ω¯ss[1−H(ω¯ss)]− (1 + ρ)h(ω¯ss)
}
ξfocK = (1− µ)RKE(ω|ω < ω¯) +Rω¯ss[1−H(ω¯ss)]− (1 + ρ)Q
ξfocN = N(1 + ρ)
ξfocSt+1 = (1 + ρ)(QK −N)
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ξfocSt = (1 + ρ)(θQK −N)
Lender Participation Constraint.
ξPCR rt+1 + ξ
PC
K kt+1 + ξ
PC
ω¯ ω¯t + ξ
PC
N nt − ξPCS (st+1 − st) = 0 (E.2)
where
ξPCR = RK[1−H(ω¯ss)− µω¯ssh(ω¯ss)][1−H(ω¯ss)] ω¯ss
εPCK = RK[1−H(ω¯ss)− µω¯ssh(ω¯ss)][1−H(ω¯ss)] ω¯ss
ξPCN = N(1 + ρ)[1−H(ω¯ss)]
ξPCω¯ = ω¯
ss
{
RK[1−H(ω¯ss)− µh(ω¯ss)ω¯ss][1−H(ω¯ss)− h(ω¯ss)ω¯ss]
+E(ω|ω > ω¯)− ω¯ss[1−H(ω¯ss)] ∗ (1 + µ)h(ω¯ss)
}
− (1 + ρ)Nh(ω¯ss)
ξPCS = N(1 + ρ)[1−H(ω¯ss)]
5.5.2 Contract under Risk Aversion
First Order Condition of Contract with Respect to ωˆ.
εωˆXN(xt + nt) + ε
ωˆ
Rrt+1 + ε
ωˆ
Kkt+1 − εωˆωˆωˆt = 0 (E.3)
where
εωˆXN = XN
{
[XN + (1− ωˆss)RK]−(1+γ)[1−H(ωˆss)]2 − (XN)−(1+γ)H(ωˆss)2
}
εωˆR = R
{
γ(1− ωˆss)K[XN + (1− ωˆss)RK]−(1+γ)[1−H(ωˆss)]2
}
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εωˆK = K
{
γ(1− ωˆss)R[XN + (1− ωˆss)RK]−(1+γ)[1−H(ωˆss)]2
}
εωˆωˆ = ωˆ
ss
{
γ(1− ωˆss)RK[XN + (1− ωˆss)RK]−(1+γ)[1−H(ωˆss)]2
−(XN)−(1+γ)H(ωˆss)3h(ωˆss)− (XN)−γH(ωˆss)
}
First Order Condition of Contract with Respect to Kt+1.
εKXN(xt + nt) + ε
K
R rt+1 + ε
K
Kkt+1 − εKωˆ ωˆt + εKS (st+1 − θst) = 0 (E.4)
where
εKXN = XNγ
{
[(1− ρ)− (1− µ)E(ω|ω < ωˆ)R− E(ω|ω > ωˆ)R]
[XN + (1− ωˆss)RK]−γ[1−H(ωˆss)]
+[(1− ρ)− (1− µ)E(ω|ω < ωˆ)R−Rωˆss[1−H(ωˆss)]](XN)−(1+γ)H(ωˆss)
+R[XN + (1− ωˆss)RK]−(1+γ) 1 + γ
XN + (1− ωˆss)RK σ
2
ω
}
εKR = R
{
[(1− ρ)− (1− µ)E(ω|ω < ωˆ)R
−E(ω|ω > ωˆ)R][XN + (1− ωˆss)RK]−γ[1−H(ωˆss)](1− ωˆss)γK
+
(
(XN)−γH(ωˆss) + [XN + (1− ωˆss)RK]−γ[1−H(ωˆss)]
)
(1− µ)E(ω|ω < ωˆ) + (XN)−(1+γ)ωˆss[1−H(ωˆss)]
−[γ(XN + (1− ωˆss)RK)]−(1+γ)
[
1− 1 + γ
XN + (1− ωˆss)RK
]
σ2ω
}
εKK = K
{
[(1− ρ)− (1− µ)E(ω|ω < ωˆ)R
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−E(ω|ω > ωˆ)R][XN + (1− ωˆss)RK]−γ[1−H(ωˆss)](1− ωˆss)R
+R2γ[XN + (1− ωˆss)RK]−(1+γ) 1 + γ
XN + (1− ωˆss)RK (1− ωˆ
ss) σ2ω
}
εKωˆ = ωˆ
ss
{
[(1− ρ)− (1− µ)E(ω|ω < ωˆ)R
−E(ω|ω > ωˆ)R][XN + (1− ωˆss)RK]−γ[1−H(ωˆss)]γRK+
[
(XN)−γH(ωˆss)−
(
(XN)−γH(ωˆss) + [XN + (1− ωˆss)RK]−γ[1−H(ωˆss)]
)
(1− µ)
]
Rh(ωˆss)ωˆss − (XN)−γH(ωˆss)R[1−H(ωˆss)− h(ωˆss)ωˆss]
+R2Kγ[XN + (1− ωˆss)RK]−(1+γ) 1 + γ
XN + (1− ωˆss)RK σ
2
ω
}
εKS = (1 + ρ)Q
[
(XN)−γH(ωˆss) + [XN + (1− ωˆss)RK]−γ[1−H(ωˆss)]
]
Lender Participation Constraint.
εPCXN(xt + nt) = ε
PC
R rt+1 − εPCK kt+1 + εPCωˆ ωˆt + εPCN nt − εPCSt+1 st+1 + εPCSt st (E.5)
where
εPCXN = XN
εPCR = R
{
(1− µ)E(ω|ω < ωˆ)K +K[1−H(ωˆss)] ωˆss
}
εPCK = Y K
εPCωˆ = ωˆ
ssRK[1−H(ωˆss)]
εPCN = N(1 + ρ)
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εPCSt+1 = (1 + ρ)[QK −N ]
εPCSt = (1 + ρ)[θQK −N ]
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